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Abstract 
The fact that information is ubiquitous throughout most modern organisations 
cannot be denied. Information is not merely used as an enabler in modern 
organisations today, but is also used to gain a competitive advantage over 
competitors. Thus, information has become one of the most important business 
assets.  It is, therefore, imperative that organisations protect information assets as 
they would protect other business assets. This is typically achieved through 
implementing various security measures. 
Technological and procedural security measures are largely dependent on 
humans. However, the incorrect behaviour of humans poses a significant threat to 
the protection of these information assets. Thus, it is vital to understand how 
human behaviour may impact the protection of information assets. 
While the focus of much literature is on organisations, the focus of this research is 
on higher education institutions and the factors of information security, with a 
specific focus on influencing the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates. Typically, computing graduates would be employed in organisations in 
various careers such as software developers, network administrators, database 
administrators and information systems analysts. Employment in these careers 
means that they would be closely interacting with information assets and 
information systems. 
A real problem, as identified by this research, is that currently, many higher 
education institutions are not consciously doing enough to positively influence the 
information security behaviour of their computing graduates.  
This research presents a model to address various factors that could influence the 
information security behaviour of computing graduates. The aim of this model is to 
assist computing educators in influencing computing graduates to adopt more 
secure behaviour, such as security assurance behaviour. A literature review was 
conducted to identify the research problem. A number of theories such as the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour, Protection Motivation Theory and Social Cognitive 
Theory were identified as being relevant for this research as they provided a 
theoretical foundation for factors that could influence the information security 
behaviour of computing graduates. Additionally, a survey was conducted to gather 
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the opinions and perceptions of computing educators relating to information 
security education in higher education institutions. Results indicated that 
information security is not pervasively integrated within the higher education 
institutions surveyed. Furthermore, results revealed that most computing students 
were perceived to not be behaving in a secure manner with regard to information 
security. This could negatively influence their information security behaviour as 
computing graduates employed within organisations. Computing educators 
therefore require assistance in influencing the information security behaviour of 
these computing students. The proposed model to provide this assistance was 
developed through argumentation and modelling. 
 IV | P a g e  
 
Table of contents 
 
 
1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Background......................................................................................................................... 2 
1.3 Identification of Problem Area ........................................................................................... 3 
1.4 Problem Statement ............................................................................................................ 4 
1.5 Research Objectives ........................................................................................................... 4 
1.5.1 Primary Objective ....................................................................................................... 4 
1.5.2 Secondary Objectives ................................................................................................. 5 
1.6 Research Methods ............................................................................................................. 5 
1.6.1 Literature Review ....................................................................................................... 6 
1.6.2 Survey ......................................................................................................................... 7 
1.6.3 Modelling ................................................................................................................... 7 
1.6.4 Argumentation ........................................................................................................... 7 
1.7 Delineation and Limitations ............................................................................................... 8 
1.8 Ethical Considerations ........................................................................................................ 8 
1.9 Chapter Layout ................................................................................................................... 8 
1.10 Published Work ................................................................................................................ 10 
1.11 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 11 
 
2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 12 
2.2 Research Approaches ....................................................................................................... 12 
2.2.1 Deductive Reasoning ................................................................................................ 13 
2.2.2 Inductive Reasoning ................................................................................................. 13 
2.3 Research Techniques and Procedures ............................................................................. 14 
2.3.1 Sampling ................................................................................................................... 14 
2.3.2 Data Collection ......................................................................................................... 16 
2.4 Research Process .............................................................................................................. 17 
2.4.1 Interview Process ..................................................................................................... 18 
2.4.2 Participants ............................................................................................................... 19 
2.4.3 Questionnaire Design ............................................................................................... 19 
2.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 22 
 
3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 23 
 V | P a g e  
 
3.2 Importance of Information as a Business Asset ............................................................... 23 
3.3 Threats and Vulnerabilities Relating to Information Assets ............................................ 24 
3.4 Understanding Information Security................................................................................ 26 
3.4.1 Critical Information Characteristics .......................................................................... 27 
3.4.2 Information States .................................................................................................... 28 
3.4.3 Security Measures .................................................................................................... 28 
3.5 The Importance of Information Security Policies ............................................................. 29 
3.6 Managing Information Security Risk ................................................................................ 30 
3.7 Information Security Standards and Best Practices ......................................................... 31 
3.7.1 ISO/IEC 27001 (2013) ............................................................................................... 32 
3.7.2 ISO/IEC 27005 (2011) ............................................................................................... 33 
3.7.3 NIST 800-16 (2013) ................................................................................................... 33 
3.7.4 NIST 800-50 (2003) ................................................................................................... 33 
3.7.5 NIST 800-100 (2006) ................................................................................................. 34 
3.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 34 
 
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 36 
4.2 The Need for Information Security Education ................................................................. 37 
4.3 Information Security Awareness, Training and Education ............................................... 38 
4.3.1 Information Security Awareness .............................................................................. 39 
4.3.2 Information Security Training .................................................................................. 39 
4.3.3 Information Security Education ............................................................................... 40 
4.4 ACM CS/IS/IT Curricular Guidelines ................................................................................. 41 
4.5 Knowledge Creation ......................................................................................................... 43 
4.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 45 
 
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 47 
5.2 Human Aspects of Information Security .......................................................................... 48 
5.3 Human Behaviour ............................................................................................................. 49 
5.4 Behavioural Theories ........................................................................................................ 50 
5.4.1 Theory of Planned Behaviour ................................................................................... 50 
5.4.2 Protection Motivation Theory .................................................................................. 52 
5.4.3 Social Cognitive Theory ............................................................................................ 53 
5.5 Factors that Could Influence Behaviour ........................................................................... 55 
5.6 Information Security Behaviour ....................................................................................... 56 
5.6.1 Security Assurance Behaviour .................................................................................. 56 
 VI | P a g e  
 
5.6.2 Security Compliant Behaviour .................................................................................. 57 
5.6.3 Security Risk-taking Behaviour ................................................................................. 57 
5.6.4 Security Damaging Behaviour .................................................................................. 57 
5.7 Information Security Culture ............................................................................................ 59 
5.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 60 
 
6.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 62 
6.2 Results and Findings ......................................................................................................... 63 
6.2.1 Survey Objective 1 .................................................................................................... 63 
6.2.2 Survey Objective 2 .................................................................................................... 65 
6.2.3 Survey Objective 3 .................................................................................................... 66 
6.3 Significant Findings ........................................................................................................... 68 
6.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 71 
 
7.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 73 
7.2 Factors Influencing Information Security Behaviour........................................................ 73 
7.3 Development of Proposed Model .................................................................................... 78 
7.4 The Proposed Model ........................................................................................................ 84 
7.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 87 
 
8.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 89 
8.2 Summary of Chapters ....................................................................................................... 89 
8.3 Meeting of Research Objectives ...................................................................................... 92 
8.4 Research Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research ............................................ 94 
8.5 Epilogue ............................................................................................................................ 95 
 
 
  Appendix A: Conference Paper…………………………………………………………………………………………………104 
  Appendix B1: Survey Questionnaire…………………………………………………………………………………………116 
  Appendix B2: Survey Checklist…………………………………………………………………………………………………120 
 
 
  
 VII | P a g e  
 
 List of Tables 
Table 1.1: Research objectives and methods ............................................................................ 6 
Table 2.1: A comparison of deductive and inductive research .............................................. 12 
Table 2.2: Survey objective 1 questions ................................................................................... 21 
Table 2.3: Survey objective 2 questions ................................................................................... 21 
Table 2.4: Survey objective 3 checklist ..................................................................................... 22 
Table 3.1: Threats and consequences relating to information assets .................................. 25 
Table 3.2: Information security standards and best practices ............................................... 32 
Table 4.1: Awareness, training and education comparative framework............................... 38 
Table 6.1: Survey objective 1 closed questions and responses ............................................ 63 
Table 6.2: Survey objective 2 closed questions and responses ............................................ 65 
Table 6.3: Survey objective 3 checklist ..................................................................................... 67 
Table 6.4: Summary of significant findings ............................................................................... 71 
Table 7.1: Factors influencing information security behaviour .............................................. 74 
 
  
 VIII | P a g e  
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Chapter layout...............................................................................................10 
Figure 2.1: Differences between population (census), sample and individual cases or 
elements ..........................................................................................................................14 
Figure 2.2: Research process .........................................................................................18 
Figure 2.3: Link between secondary objectives and survey objectives ............................20 
Figure 3.1: McCumber's model .......................................................................................26 
Figure 4.1: Modes of Knowledge Creation ......................................................................44 
Figure 5.1: The Theory of Planned Behaviour .................................................................51 
Figure 5.2: Protection Motivation Theory .........................................................................52 
Figure 5.3: Social Cognitive Theory ................................................................................54 
Figure 5.4: Relationship between organisational culture, information security culture and 
information security behaviour .........................................................................................59 
Figure 7.1: Personal, behavioural and environmental factors ..........................................79 
Figure 7.2: Personal, behavioural and environmental factors with intention ....................81 
Figure 7.3: Information security education and policy factors ..........................................82 
Figure 7.4: Proposed model ............................................................................................85 
 
  
 1 | P a g e  
 
 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
Information is considered to be the oxygen of modern organisations. It is used to 
drive most business processes, involving users from the highest to the lowest level 
within organisations. Information is not merely used as an enabler in modern 
organisations, but is also used to gain a competitive advantage over competitors 
(Von Solms & Von Solms, 2006). Information security has thus, become 
increasingly important to organisations. Therefore, it is of critical importance that 
organisations to make the protection of these information assets a top priority. 
Information security is defined as “the protection of information and information 
systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 
destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity and availability” (Committee 
on National Security Systems, 2010). Humans are often cited as being the 
“weakest link” when it comes to information security within organisations (Van 
Niekerk & Von Solms, 2005; Safa et al., 2015; Thomson & Von Solms, 2006; Von 
Solms & Von Solms, 2004).  
Computing graduates need to demonstrate the required information security 
behaviour in order to protect an organisation’s information assets. In the context of 
this research, computing graduates refers to Information Technology (IT), 
Information Systems (IS) and Computer Science (CS) graduates. When these 
graduates are employed in organisations, they too become users, typically being 
employed as network specialists, database administrators and information 
systems analysts within organisations. If computing graduates have been exposed 
to information security education during their studies, they could champion 
information security initiatives within these organisations. However, education 
alone cannot influence the information security behaviour. Education as well as 
other factors could influence the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates.  
The remainder of this proposal is organised as follows: Section 1.2 explores and 
discusses the background to this research. The identification of the problem area 
is discussed in Section 1.3 while the problem statement is presented in Section 
1.4. The research objectives to address the identified problem are discussed in 
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Section 1.5, while the research methods are presented in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 
presents the delineation of this research and Section 1.8 discusses the ethical 
considerations. The chapter layout of this research, published work and conclusion 
are highlighted in Sections 1.9, 1.10 and 1.11 respectively. 
1.2 Background  
The importance of information being a vital organisational asset cannot be 
stressed enough. Information is critical to organisations. However, it is vulnerable 
to threats and attacks from both insiders and outsiders. Insider threats may cause 
more damaging and costly incidents than outsider threats. Despite organisations 
taking various security measures to protect these information assets, information 
security breaches are still on the increase. This is often due to a lack of 
cooperation from employees and a lack of knowledge on how to implement these 
security measures.  Therefore, it has been cited that employees are the greatest 
threat to information security (Tajuddin, Olphert, & Doherty, 2014; Tu & Yuan, 
2014). Organisations need to focus their attention more on employee behaviour in 
order to mitigate potential threats (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014).  
Organisations should have information security policies in place to communicate to 
employees what the acceptable information security behaviour is. Employee 
compliance with regard to these policies is essential in ensuring that these 
organisational assets remain protected. However, employees often ignore, or do 
not comply with, these policies. The reasons for this include a lack of awareness 
and ignorance (Cox, 2012). Ultimately, the behaviour of employees should lead to 
the cultivation of an information security culture. An information security culture is 
important as it guides and shapes the information behaviour of employees 
(Alhogail & Mirza, 2014). A holistic approach is, therefore, needed regarding the 
management of information security. Such a holistic approach should include 
technological, procedural and human factor security measures (Tohidi, 2011). 
Van Niekerk and Von Solms (2005) argue that many security measures are liable 
to be misused or misinterpreted by users without adequate security knowledge 
and behaviour. Many researchers argue that users have to be educated and 
trained to be information security conscious and motivated to comply with security 
policies and procedures. This could assist in the mitigation of some of the threats 
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(Al Awawdeh & Tubaishat, 2014;Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2012). Information 
security education is necessary to ensure that users have the required knowledge 
to behave in a secure manner (Okere, Van Niekerk, & Carroll, 2012). The need to 
integrate professional practice into the curriculum is founded on real world issues 
such as the increase in security breaches, the public’s demand for higher quality 
products, the needs of organisations (private and public) and the need to promote 
life-long learning after graduation (Lunt, Ekstrom, & Lawson, 2008).  
Computing graduates entering the work environment should be able to exhibit and 
be skilled in the underlying principles of information security (Futcher, Schroder, & 
Von Solms, 2010).  These computing graduates would, for example, typically be 
computer programmers, information security analysts, software developers, and 
database administrators. As such, they would interact with information assets and 
information systems. Information security education could, therefore, teach these 
students the fundamental principles they need in order to preserve and protect the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of an organisation’s information assets 
(Florentine, 2014; Pratt, 2014). For the purpose of this research, computing 
graduates refers to computing students when they successfully complete their 
qualifications within higher education institutions. However, they are referred to as 
computing students while they are still pursuing their qualifications. 
1.3 Identification of Problem Area 
Employees often participate in risky behaviour that can threaten the confidentiality, 
integrity and the availability of an organisation’s information assets. Employee 
behaviour accounts for the majority of security breaches experienced by 
organisations, although often not with malicious intent to cause harm. Employees 
who have not been educated with regard to information security could be easy 
targets for hackers because of their vulnerabilities. Therefore, educated and 
trained employees could be a critical success factor in the mitigation of threats 
within organisations (Al Awawdeh & Tubaishat, 2014; Cox, 2012).  
Employee behaviour should be one of the main focus areas of an organisation’s 
approach towards information security. This is due to the fact that employee 
behaviour has an impact on the success or failure of organisations (Da Veiga & 
Eloff, 2010). There is a general consensus in literature that employee behaviour 
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poses significant risk in the protection of information assets in organisations 
(Alhogail & Mirza, 2014a; Thomson & Von Solms, 2006; Van Niekerk & Von 
Solms, 2010). Although organisations invest a great deal in new technology in an 
effort to try to protect their information assets, this is not enough. Organisations 
need to focus more on employee behaviour and to find ways in which they can 
influence this behaviour positively to ensure that information security becomes 
second nature to their employees (Blythe, 2013).  
Higher education institutions are responsible for producing computing graduates 
who understand information security principles. Graduates are also required to 
meet the needs of industry when employed by these organisations (Talib, Khelifi, 
& Ugurlu, 2012). International standards and guidelines provide guidance for 
security requirements and, in order to fulfil these requirements, organisations need 
employees with the necessary knowledge and skills to help alleviate security 
breaches (Armstrong, 2011; Talib et al., 2012).  Computing graduates are typically 
employed to configure, operate and maintain information systems. It is therefore 
important that computing graduates demonstrate the correct information security 
behaviour to be able to solve real world security-related problems. However, there 
are various factors that could influence the information security behaviour of 
computing graduates. This research focuses specifically on the factors which 
influence such behaviour directly or indirectly. 
1.4 Problem Statement 
The problem that this research addresses and attempts to solve is defined as: 
Currently, many higher education institutions are not consciously doing 
enough to positively influence the information security behaviour of their 
computing graduates. 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The research objectives that have been formulated to address the identified 
problem are discussed in this section. 
1.5.1 Primary Objective 
In order to address the problem identified in Section 1.4, the following primary 
objective has been identified: 
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To develop a model to address the factors that could positively influence the 
information security behaviour of computing graduates. 
1.5.2 Secondary Objectives 
To achieve the primary objective, a number of secondary objectives are defined. 
1. To determine the importance of information security in organisations. 
2. To determine the importance of information security education in higher 
education institutions with a specific focus on computing curricula. 
3. To understand information security behaviour and to identify key factors 
that could influence the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates. 
4. To determine the extent to which information security is currently integrated 
within computing curricula in a South African context. 
5. To determine the perceptions of computing educators regarding the 
information security behaviour of computing students in a South African 
context. 
1.6 Research Methods 
The following methods have been used in this research, namely: a literature 
review, survey, modelling and argumentation. Table 1.1 depicts the research 
methods that were used to address each of the objectives.  
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Objectives Methods 
Secondary Objective 1 (SO1) 
To determine the importance of information 
security in organisations 
Literature review 
Secondary Objective 2 (SO2) 
To determine the importance of information 
security education in higher education institutions 
with a specific focus on computing curricula. 
Literature review 
Secondary Objective 3 (SO3) 
To understand information security behaviour and 
to identify key factors that could influence the 
information security behaviour of computing 
graduates 
Literature review 
Argumentation 
Secondary Objective 4 (SO4) 
To determine the extent to which information 
security is currently integrated within computing 
curricula in a South African context. 
Survey 
Secondary Objective 5 (SO5) 
To determine the perceptions of computing 
educators regarding the information security 
behaviour of computing students in a South African 
context. 
Survey 
Primary Objective (PO) 
To develop a model to address factors that could 
influence the information security behaviour of 
computing graduates positively. 
Modelling 
Argumentation 
Table 1.1: Research objectives and methods  
Refer to Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the research design including the 
research process and survey design. A discussion on each of the research 
methods and how they relate to the research objectives is presented below. 
1.6.1 Literature Review 
According to Collis and Hussey (2014) a literature review is defined as “a critical 
evaluation of the existing body of knowledge on a topic, which guides the research 
and demonstrates that relevant literature has been located and analysed.” 
In terms of this research, this method was used to determine the importance of 
information security in organisations; to determine the importance of information 
security education in higher education institutions with a specific focus on 
computing curricula; and to understand information security behaviour and to 
identify key factors that could influence the information security behaviour of 
computing graduates. 
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1.6.2 Survey 
According to Hofstee (2006) surveys can be used as an excellent way of finding 
out people’s opinions, desires and attitudes. Surveys can either be in the form of 
interviews or questionnaires. 
In terms of this research, a survey in the form of semi-structured interviews 
supported by a questionnaire was conducted to determine the extent to which 
information security is currently integrated within computing curricula in a South 
African context. Furthermore, this survey was conducted to determine the 
perceptions of computing educators regarding the information security behaviour 
of computing students in a South African context. 
1.6.3 Modelling 
According to Tomhave (2005), a model is an abstract, conceptual construct that 
represents processes, variables, and relationships without providing specific 
guidance or practices for implementation.  
For the purpose of this research, modelling was used to address factors and their 
relationships and how they could influence the information security behaviour of 
computing graduates. 
1.6.4 Argumentation 
Logical argumentation is a way to substantiate a particular conclusion. It is built on 
premises and a conclusion. It is formed by combining existing facts to develop new 
facts. The conclusion often forms a premise for the following argument (Besnard & 
Hunter, 2008).  
In terms of this research, the purpose of this method was used to argue towards 
the factors and their relationships within the proposed model. Additionally, this 
method was used to understand information security behaviour and to identify key 
factors that could influence the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates. The premises of this method will be based on the facts gathered from 
the literature review as well as from the survey. 
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1.7 Delineation and Limitations 
This research was aimed at addressing factors that could positively influence the 
information security behaviour of computing graduates. However, there was no 
monitoring of the actual behaviour of computing graduates.  
The limitation of this study is that only six South African higher education 
institutions participated in the survey. Therefore, these results cannot be 
generalised.   
1.8 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical clearance was not required by this research since no personally identifiable 
information was captured at any point during the research process. Although a 
survey was conducted, there were no vulnerable groups participating. The 
participants were completely anonymous and participation was voluntary. 
1.9 Chapter Layout 
The section presents the layout for this research. The chapters that are included in 
this dissertation are highlighted, together with a brief description of each. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter is an introduction, which includes background and identification of the 
problem area. An outline of the research methods and the methodology is 
highlighted. The aforementioned form the basis of this dissertation. 
Chapter 2: Research Design 
This chapter presents a detailed discussion of the research design that was 
followed during the course of this study. It briefly discusses the research approach 
that was followed as well as the research techniques and procedures that were 
used. Furthermore, this chapter outlines the research process of the survey that 
was conducted including the interview process, the participants and the 
questionnaire design. 
Chapter 3: Information Security  
Chapter 3 briefly describes information security. It highlights the importance of 
information as a business asset. It identifies threats to information security, and 
discusses the importance of information security as well as the importance of 
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information security policies. In addition, it provides an overview of various 
information security standards and best practices relating to the human factor. 
Chapter 4: Information Security in Higher Education 
This chapter addresses the need for information security education. A distinction 
between information security awareness, training and education is highlighted. In 
addition, this chapter discusses various Association for Computing Machinery 
(ACM) computing curricular guidelines and the importance of knowledge creation. 
Chapter 5: Information Security Behaviour 
This chapter provides an overview of information security behaviour. Additionally, 
the human aspects of information security are discussed. This is followed by a 
general discussion on human behaviour. Behavioural theories relating to this 
research are identified and discussed, together with the factors that could 
influence human behaviour. This is followed by a discussion on information 
security behaviour, as well as a brief discussion on information security culture. 
Chapter 6: Survey Results and Findings 
This chapter provides the results and significant findings from the survey that is 
described in Chapter 2. The aim of the survey was to determine the perception of 
computing educators relating to information security education in higher education 
institutions. 
Chapter 7: Proposed Model  
This chapter introduces the model that represents the solution to the problem 
identified by this research. Firstly, the factors that could influence the information 
security behaviour of computing graduates are addressed. Secondly, the 
contribution to this research, which is the model, is presented and discussed. 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This chapter includes a summary of chapters. Additionally, it argues that the 
research objectives have been met. Furthermore, research limitations and 
suggestions for future research are presented and finally, the chapter concludes 
with an epilogue. 
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Figure 1.1: Chapter layout 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the chapter layout for this research and how each of these 
chapters relate to one another. 
1.10 Published Work 
The following publication was presented at the International Conference on 
Information Resources Management (Conf-IRM) held in Cape Town on 16 May 
2016. Refer to Appendix A for the full conference paper. 
 Mabece, T., Futcher, L. & Thomson, K.L (2016). Towards using 
pervasive information security education to influence information 
security behaviour in undergraduate computing graduates, International 
 11 | P a g e  
 
Conference on Information Resources Management (Conf-IRM), Cape 
Town. 
The following paper has been accepted and will be presented at the 10th World 
Information Security Education (WISE) Conference which will be held in Rome, 
Italy in May 2017.   
 Mabece, T., Futcher, L. & Thomson, K.L (2017). South African 
Computing Educators’ Perspectives on Information Security Behaviour” 
has been accepted for the 10th World Information Security Education 
(WISE) Conference, which will be held in Rome in May 2017. 
1.11 Conclusion 
This chapter presents an overview of this research. It highlights the problem of 
higher education institutions currently not doing enough to influence the 
information security behaviour of computing graduates. This could be addressed 
by developing a model to address factors that could influence the information 
security behaviour of computing graduates.  
The following chapter will discuss the research design of this research in more 
detail. 
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 2: Research Design 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the research process that was followed 
during the work conducted in this research. The research methods that were used 
as part of this study are briefly defined and introduced. The research process 
started with a literature review in the field of information security education as well 
as information security behaviour. This literature review was done primarily to 
ascertain the problem that this research aims to solve. This was followed by a 
survey in the form of semi-structured interviews in six South African higher 
education institutions.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 identifies and 
discusses research approaches. The research techniques and procedures, which 
include sampling and data collection, are discussed in Section 2.3 while Section 
2.4 presents the research process that was followed in this study. 
2.2 Research Approaches 
According to Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill (2012), there are typically two 
approaches that one can take to make deductions and to draw significance from 
the outcomes. These approaches are deductive and inductive reasoning.  
  Deduction Induction 
Logic In a deductive inference, 
when the premises are 
true, the conclusion must also 
be true 
In an inductive inference, 
known premises are used 
to generate untested 
conclusions 
 
Generalisability Generalising from the general 
to the specific 
Generalising from the 
specific to the general 
Use of data Data collection is used to 
evaluate propositions or 
hypotheses related to an 
existing theory 
 
Data collection is used to 
explore a phenomenon, to 
identify themes and 
patterns and to create a 
conceptual framework 
 
Theory Theory falsification or 
verification 
Theory generation and 
building 
Table 2.1: A comparison of deductive and inductive research (Saunders et al., 
2012) 
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Table 2.1 illustrates the differences between the two approaches in terms of logic, 
generalisability, use of data and theory. 
The following section discusses the differences between the two approaches. 
2.2.1 Deductive Reasoning 
Saunders et al., (2012) posit that deductive reasoning involves the formulation of a 
theory that is subjected to a rigorous test through a series of propositions. 
Essentially, deductive reasoning takes a “top-down” approach by starting with 
general theoretical concepts that develop towards a specific hypothesis. If, for 
example, your research starts off with a theory which is often developed from a 
literature survey, and you design a research strategy to test the theory, you are 
using a deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2012).  
The research approach presented below is discussed in relation to its applicability 
to this research study. 
2.2.2 Inductive Reasoning 
Alternatively, inductive reasoning does not start with the formulation of a theory. It 
begins with research questions, aims and objectives that need to be achieved 
during the research process (Saunders et al., 2012). This approach uses a 
“bottom-up” approach by beginning with specifics, i.e. research objectives, and 
formulates a generalisation. Hypothetically, if you start by collecting data to 
explore a phenomenon and you build a theory, then you are using an inductive 
approach (Saunders et al., 2012). 
Typically, researchers following this research approach are more likely to work 
with qualitative data and to use several methods to collect data and to form 
various views of phenomena (Saunders et al., 2012). 
Based on an initial literature review to find out more about the research area, 
several research objectives were formulated. From these research objectives and 
a further literature review, a series of questions were formulated as part of a 
survey that was conducted. This survey took the form of semi-structured 
interviews supported by a questionnaire. Consequently, the research approach 
that was followed by this research was inductive. 
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2.3 Research Techniques and Procedures 
This section discusses the research techniques and procedures followed by this 
research. 
2.3.1 Sampling 
According to Saunders et al., (2012), sampling techniques allow researchers to 
reduce the amount of data they need to collect by considering only data from a 
subgroup rather than from an entire general population. Some of the reasons why 
one would need to sample include budgetary and time constraints as well as 
impracticality. The most crucial need for sampling is that it needs to fulfil a 
research objective or research question (Saunders et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 2.1: Differences between population (census), sample and individual cases 
or elements (Saunders et al., 2012) 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the differences between population (census), sample and 
individual cases. In some cases, it may be possible to collect and analyse data 
from the entire “population”. This is known as a census. However, as highlighted 
previously, it might not always be practical to collect and analyse data for an entire 
population owing to, for example, budgetary and time constraints. Some research 
objectives only require sample data to generalise from, once your “sample” has 
been selected. Sampling techniques enable you to reduce the amount of data that 
needs to be collected by considering only data from a subgroup rather than all 
possible “cases” or “elements” (Saunders et al., 2012). 
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There are two sampling techniques suggested by Saunders et al., (2012), namely: 
“probability” and “non-probability” sampling. Probability sampling occurs when the 
researcher selects a large number of participants meeting specific criteria from an 
existing and accurate sample (Saunders et al., 2012).  
Some common advantages of probability sampling include (Saunders et al., 2012):  
 The absence of systematic and sampling bias 
 A higher level of reliability of research findings 
 Increased accuracy of sampling error estimation 
 The possibility of making inferences about the population 
 
Some common disadvantages of probability sampling include (Saunders et al., 
2012): 
 Higher complexity compared to non-probability sampling 
 More time-consuming 
 Usually more expensive than non-probability sampling 
Non-probability sampling occurs when not all of the members of the population 
have a chance of participating in the study. Saunders et al., (2012) argue that non-
probability sampling provides a range of alternative techniques, such as purposive 
non-probability sampling, the majority of which include an element of subjective 
judgement. It is good to use non-probability sampling in the exploratory stages of 
some research studies (Saunders et al., 2012). 
Some common advantages of non-probability sampling include  (Saunders et al., 
2012): 
 The possibility of reflecting the descriptive comments about the sample 
 Cost-effectiveness and time-effectiveness compared to probability sampling 
 Effective when it is unfeasible or impractical to conduct probability sampling 
Some common disadvantages of non-probability sampling include  (Saunders et 
al., 2012): 
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 The unknown proportion of the entire population is not included in the 
sample group, i.e. a lack of representation of the entire population 
 A lower level of generalization of research findings compared to probability 
sampling 
 Difficulties in estimating sampling variability and identifying possible bias 
This research study makes use of the purposive non-probability sampling 
technique. This is due to the fact that the researcher used her own judgement to 
select a sample that is better suited to achieve the researcher’s research 
objectives.  Saunders et al. (2012) recommend that the most appropriate sample 
size for purposive non-probability sampling is between twenty to twenty-five 
participants. In terms of this research, the sample size was twenty participants, 
which is in accordance with the recommended sampling size.  The only 
prerequisite to the interviews was that participants had to be computing educators 
in higher education institutions, i.e. they had to be educators in Information 
Technology (IT), Computer Science (CS) or Information Systems (IS). 
2.3.2 Data Collection  
Data collection techniques can either gather primary or secondary data. Primary 
data is research that is collected first-hand by the researcher, rather than that 
found in a book, journal article or database (Driscoll, 2011). Driscoll (2011) 
highlights that the ultimate goal in conducting primary research is to learn 
something new that can be supported by other researchers and that can eliminate 
our own biases. Secondary data, on the other hand, is derived from existing 
literature and other data sources (Driscoll, 2011).  
Both primary and secondary data were used in this research study. A literature 
study formed the theoretical foundation and served as a secondary data source. 
The aim of the initial literature study was used to be exploratory in nature in order 
to understand the fields of information security education and information security 
behaviour.  
Furthermore, primary data was generated through a survey. This survey was in 
the form of semi-structured interviews with the aid of a questionnaire as the 
research tool. This survey was used to determine the extent to which information 
security is currently integrated within computing curricula, as well as to determine 
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the current behaviours of computing students and educators. Quantitative data 
was collected through asking participants closed questions, while qualitative data 
was collected through open-ended questions. Therefore, both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis was used for this research 
Quantitative analysis is the study of data that can be measured, the quantities of a 
category of data. Descriptive statistics are used to describe quantitative data. 
Descriptive statistics describes what the data is and what it shows by making use 
of visual representations such as tables or graphs to present the data (Saunders 
et al., 2012). These tables or graphs are used to summarise responses as 
frequency counts and percentages (Saunders et al., 2012), which refers to 
quantitative data analysis. This research study used visual data representations in 
the form of tables to present the data, showing percentages of responses.   
Qualitative analysis is the scientific study of data that can be observed, but not 
measured  (Saunders et al., 2012). It is concerned with cataloguing the qualities of 
what is studied. In this study, open-ended questions were used to collect 
qualitative data. The use of open-ended questions allowed the researcher to gain 
meaningful data regarding computing educators’ perceptions. The qualitative 
analysis relating to this research is presented in Section 6.2.1, Section 6.2.2, and 
Section 6.2.3. The qualitative data was interpreted to present meaningful results 
based on computing educators’ perceptions. 
2.4 Research Process 
This section explains the process that was followed by this research. In addition, it 
describes the semi-structured interview process, and the participants, as well as 
the questionnaire that was used as a tool to gather information during the semi-
structured interviews conducted. Figure 2.2 depicts the research process that was 
followed by this research. 
An initial literature review was conducted to identify a relevant problem in the 
chosen field of study, namely information security education. Thereafter, research 
objectives were determined to address the identified problem. Based on a 
literature review that addressed secondary objective 1 (SO1) secondary objective 
2 (SO2) and secondary objective 3 (SO3), a questionnaire was developed. The 
questionnaire was used as a tool during the survey that was conducted. 
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Figure 2.2: Research process 
The survey addressed secondary objective 4 (SO4) and secondary objective 5 
(SO5). Argumentation addressed secondary objective 3 (SO3) and the primary 
objective (PO). Information elicited from the literature review and the survey was 
used to argue towards the proposed model. The primary objective (PO) of this 
research was met through argumentation and modelling. For a more detailed 
breakdown of these objectives, refer to Chapter 1, Section 1.5.2, 
2.4.1 Interview Process 
A semi-structured interview was conducted with twenty participants, with the aid of 
a questionnaire to gather the opinions of the participants. Sixteen of the twenty 
participants were interviewed one-on-one, while four participants preferred to be 
interviewed in pairs. The interviews concluded with each participant completing a 
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brief checklist as per Table 2.4. The aim of the checklist was to determine the 
importance of various information security behaviours. Participation in this survey 
was completely voluntary and participants remained anonymous. 
2.4.2 Participants 
The participants consisted of educators from previously mentioned computing 
disciplines. These educators were selected from six South African higher 
education institutions. Three were from Computer Science (CS), eight from 
Information Technology (IT) and nine from Information Systems (IS). It is important 
to note that not all of these participants were affiliated with, nor necessarily taught, 
information security or information security-related modules. 
2.4.3 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire was divided into three sections with each section focusing on a 
single survey objective (SvO), as follows:  
1. To determine computing educators’ perspectives regarding the extent to 
which information security is currently integrated within computing curricula 
and their perceptions regarding the pervasive integration of information 
security (SvO1). 
2. To determine the current information security behaviour of computing 
students and educators as perceived by computing educators (SvO2). 
3. To determine the importance of various information security related 
behaviours as perceived by computing educators (SvO3).  
For the full questionnaire, including the survey checklist, refer to Appendices B1 
and B2. 
 20 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Link between secondary objectives and survey objectives 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the link between the secondary objectives discussed in 
Chapter 1 and the survey objectives. It is important to note that SO4 and SO5 
refer to secondary objective 4 and 5 respectively. Additionally, SvO1, SvO2 and 
SvO3 refer to survey objective 1, 2 and 3 respectively, as seen in Figure 2.3. The 
survey was used to address SO4 and SO5. SO4 was addressed by SvO1 which 
determined computing educators’ perspectives regarding the extent to which 
information security is currently integrated within computing curricula and their 
perceptions regarding the pervasive integration of information security; SO5 was 
addressed by SvO2 which was to determine the current information security 
behaviour of computing students and educators as perceived by computing 
educators, and SvO3 which was to determine the importance of various 
information security related behaviours as perceived by computing educators. 
Table 2.2 consists of a comprehensive list of questions contained in survey 
objective 1 (SvO1) of the questionnaire. This section consisted of closed (yes/no) 
and open-ended questions. 
The primary aim of survey objective 1 (SvO1) was to ascertain the perceptions of 
the participants on whether information security was integrated within the higher 
education institution’s undergraduate computing curriculum and their perceptions 
regarding the pervasive integration of information security.  
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No. Survey Objective 1 Questions 
1.1 Do you teach any security-related modules? 
1.2 If yes, which level? 
1.3 Is information security pervasively integrated within other 
modules?  
1.4 If yes, which modules? 
1.5 Do you think information security should be an important part of 
your specific discipline? 
1.6 If yes, why? If no, why not? 
1.7 What are your views on the pervasive integration of information 
security within your discipline? 
1.8 Do you think that your colleagues share the same views with 
regard to the pervasive integration of information security? 
1.9 If yes, why? If no, why not? 
1.10 Do you foresee any perceived challenges with regard to 
pervasive integration of information security? 
1.11 If yes, what perceived challenges do you foresee? 
Table 2.2: Survey objective 1 questions 
Table 2.3 indicates the list of questions contained in survey objective 2 (SvO2) of 
the questionnaire. This section consisted of closed (yes/no) and open-ended 
questions. 
No. Survey Objective 2 Questions 
2.1 Do you think that your students behave in a secure manner? 
2.2 If yes, how so? If no, why do you say so? 
2.3 Are you aware of any information security behavioural policies within 
your institution? 
2.4 Are students aware of these ICT usage policies? 
2.5 Are there any consequences for "incorrect" ICT usage policy 
behaviour? 
2.6 If so, what are they? 
2.7 In your opinion, does an information security culture exist within your 
department amongst your colleagues? 
2.8 If yes, how so? 
2.9 How would you influence a student or colleague to behave more 
securely? 
Table 2.3: Survey objective 2 questions 
The purpose of survey objective 2 (SvO2) was to determine the current 
information security behaviour of computing students and educators as perceived 
by computing educators. 
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Table 2.4 depicts the checklist of the information security behaviours included in 
survey objective 3 of the questionnaire. Behaviours 3.1 to 3.10 were rated on a 
Likert scale, where participants indicated their answers by stating a response 
between 1 and 5, where 1 indicates “not important” to 5 which indicates “very 
important”. Question 3.11 was an open-ended question. 
No. Information Security Behaviours 
3.1 Not using a computer to harm other people e.g. cyber bullying 
3.2 Not using computers to steal e.g. stealing information, software 
piracy etc. 
3.3 Not using computers to bear false witness e.g. fraudulent activity 
3.4 Not appropriating other people's intellectual output, e.g. 
plagiarism 
3.5 Using a computer in a way that ensures consideration and 
respect for your fellow humans 
3.6 Not snooping around in other people’s computer files 
3.7 Not using other people's computer resources without 
authorisation or proper compensation 
3.8 Not interfering with other people's computer work 
3.9 Thinking about the social consequences of the program you are 
writing or the system you are designing 
3.10 Not copying or using proprietary software for which you have not 
paid  
3.11 Are there any information security behaviours, not listed above, 
that you think computing students should be made aware of? 
Table 2.4: Survey objective 3 checklist (adapted from Whitman & Mattord, 2012)  
The aim of this section was for participants to indicate the importance of 
information security behaviours using Likert scale responses ranging from 1 to 5, 
where 1 indicates “not important” to 5 which indicates “very important”. Nineteen of 
the twenty participants responded to this section. The results and findings from the 
survey conducted are presented in Chapter 6, Section 6.2. 
2.5  Conclusion  
This chapter defined the systematic research process that was followed in this 
study. The research followed an inductive research approach. A survey was used 
as the primary data collection technique and a purposive non-probability sampling 
technique was used to select participants for semi-structured interviews. Primary, 
secondary and survey objectives, together with their respective methods, were 
also presented. The following chapter discusses information security in 
organisations as the primary field of study. 
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 3: Information Security 
3.1  Introduction 
Initially, information security was seen as the Information Technology (IT) 
department’s problem to deal with. Organisations nowadays, however, see 
information security and IT governance as part of the broader corporate 
organisational problem. Technology is but one aspect of the solution towards 
protecting information assets. A combination of people, technology and processes 
that provide a holistic solution to safeguard information assets is required. 
Information security, therefore,  needs to be interwoven into every business and IT 
activity, without negating the business needs and requirements (Bunker, 2012). 
This chapter is presented as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the importance of 
information as a business asset. Section 3.3 highlights threats to information 
assets, while Section 3.4 provides an understanding of information security by 
addressing McCumber’s multi-dimensional information systems security model. 
Section 3.5 highlights the importance of information security policies, followed by a 
discussion on managing information security risk in Section 3.6. Finally, Section 
3.7 presents various information security standards and best practices, followed by 
Section 3.8 which concludes the chapter. 
3.2  Importance of Information as a Business Asset 
Organisations are largely dependent on information to drive their day-to-day 
business processes (Safa & Von Solms, 2016; Von Solms & Von Solms, 2009). 
Often information and data are used interchangeably, but a clear distinction should 
be made between the two terms. Data refers to “raw, unprocessed and 
unorganised quantities, characters or symbols on which operations are performed 
by a computer” (Difference, 2016; O’Brien & Robertson, 2009; Oxford Dictionary, 
2015). When data is processed, organised, structured or presented in a given 
context to make it useful, it is referred to as “information”. This information is often 
processed, transmitted and stored by a computer (Difference, 2016; Oxford 
Dictionary, 2015). Information enables organisations to perform business 
processes, supply chain transactions and payment transactions, to name but a 
few. All of these transactions require information to be confidential, correct and 
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available when required. (ISACA, 2013; Von Solms & Von Solms, 2009). If 
information is not sufficiently protected, it can be susceptible to potential threats.  
As previously mentioned, information permeates all aspects of modern business. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that organisations make large investments in 
information systems (Coertze, 2013). An information system encompasses 
hardware, software, data, procedures and people. These are five critical 
components that enable information input, processing, output and storage 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2012). The crashing of information systems could cause 
heavy losses with respect to data and information, services and business 
operations (Bojanc & Jerman-Blažič, 2008). 
3.3 Threats and Vulnerabilities Relating to Information Assets 
A threat is an event with an undesired impact. Threats affect organisational 
information assets and information systems (ISO/IEC 27005, 2011). Viruses, 
Denial of Service (DoS) and phishing attacks are some of the threats plaguing 
organisations and threatening information assets. Threats attack information 
assets through technological or human related vulnerabilities or weaknesses. 
Many researchers have stated that humans are the “weakest link” when it comes 
to the protection of information assets (Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Komatsu, Takagi, & 
Takemura, 2013; Safa et al., 2015). Insiders or employees account for the majority 
of security breaches within organisations. Employees, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, pose a threat and may expose information assets to disclosure, 
may compromise the integrity, or may block the availability of crucial information 
systems (Landoll, 2011; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2016).  
 
Information security threats have the potential to damage information assets, 
processes and systems and, consequently, organisations. Threats may be 
technological or may be of human origin (ISO/IEC 27005, 2011). Some common 
threats to information assets are presented in Table 3.1. 
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Threat type Threats Origin 
 
 
Technical 
failures 
Equipment failure A 
Equipment malfunction A 
Saturation of the information system A, D 
Software malfunction A 
Breach of information system maintainability A, D 
Origin of threat Consequences Origin 
 
Insiders 
Unintentional errors A 
Malicious code A, D 
Unauthorised system access A, D 
Theft of information D 
System intrusion A, D 
Table 3.1: Threats and consequences relating to information assets (adapted from 
ISO/IEC 27005, 2011) 
It is important to note that this is not a comprehensive list. Threats may be 
deliberate, accidental, technical or environmental and may result, for example, in 
damage or loss of critical services. In Table 3.1, A indicates all human actions that 
can accidentally damage information assets, whereas D indicates deliberate 
actions specifically aimed at information assets (ISO/IEC 27005, 2011). 
Owing to the value and importance of information to organisations, information 
assets are susceptible to various threats and vulnerabilities. These threats and 
vulnerabilities pose significant risk to organisations (Von Solms & Von Solms, 
2009). Threats may materialise by exploiting a weakness in a system and thereby 
posing a risk to information assets. The weakness in the system is known as a 
vulnerability (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). This research focuses on the human aspect 
as a dominant vulnerability relating to information security.  
A number of organisations have fallen victim to cyber-attacks and have lost 
significant amounts of money. Cyber criminals often manipulate vulnerable and 
unsuspecting users through social engineering attacks. It is, therefore, important 
that organisations keep abreast of emergent threats and keep their employees 
aware of these threats. A major fear is that, as users get comfortable with 
traditional threats such as social engineering attacks, they think that they know 
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how to safeguard themselves against all of them. In reality, criminals are 
continually finding innovative ways to blindside their victims. By exploiting 
employee vulnerabilities, cyber criminals are tapping into the “weakest link” in the 
information security chain. Organisations, therefore, need to strengthen their first 
line of defence, which is essentially their employees (Parmar, 2013). In order to 
behave securely, employees need to be educated. If employees are educated, 
they could become the “strongest link” in the information security chain. The 
following section discusses the importance of information security. 
3.4  Understanding Information Security 
Considering the important role that information plays in organisations, the 
protection thereof is imperative. Information security is defined as “the protection 
of information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity 
and availability” (Committee on National Security Systems, 2010; ISO/IEC 27005, 
2011; Whitman & Mattord, 2012). Since information systems encompass 
hardware, software, data, procedures and people, information security is far more 
than a collection of physical and technological security measures. This can be 
seen in Figure 3.1 which illustrates McCumber’s multi-dimensional information 
systems security model. 
 
Figure 3.1: McCumber's model (McCumber, 2005) 
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This model has many uses, one of which is to provide guidance to organisations 
with regard to information security (McCumber, 2005). It is important to note that 
there have been various versions of this model. In an earlier version (McCumber, 
1991), factors are referred to as education, training and awareness. The model 
highlights the multi-dimensional aspects of information security including critical 
information characteristics, information states and security measures, as 
discussed below.  
3.4.1 Critical Information Characteristics 
Information security aims to protect the three critical characteristics of information, 
namely confidentiality, integrity and availability. These critical information 
characteristics need to be maintained regardless of the state of the information 
(McCumber, 2005). 
Confidentiality ensures that the privacy of information is maintained for 
authorised users only. This means that unauthorised users are prevented from the 
disclosure of information. The value of the confidentiality of information is higher 
when it involves personal information about employees, customers or patients. 
When unauthorised individuals can view information, confidentiality has been 
compromised. Essentially confidentiality conforms to the “for your eyes only” 
principle (Agarwal & Agarwal, 2011; McCumber, 2005; Whitman & Mattord, 2012). 
Integrity is the guarantee that the information is whole, complete and correct. The 
integrity of information is threatened when it is exposed to damage, destruction, 
corruption or other disruption of its authentic state. The threat of corruption can 
occur while information is being stored, processed or transmitted. Many computer 
viruses and worms are created with the specific purpose of corrupting data 
(Agarwal & Agarwal, 2011; McCumber, 2005; Whitman & Mattord, 2012). 
Availability is the guarantee that the information that is created, stored and 
transmitted should not only be available in the correct format when it is needed, 
but more importantly, it should be available to authorised users. The availability of 
information requires that a user be verified and authorised to access the 
information. Therefore, information should be available to authorised users in the 
correct format, when and where it is needed (Agarwal & Agarwal, 2011; 
McCumber, 2005; Whitman & Mattord, 2012). 
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3.4.2 Information States 
Information has three states. At any given moment information is being 
transmitted, stored or processed. 
Transmission refers to the transfer of information between information systems. 
For example, information could be transferring from a computer hard drive to cloud 
storage (Advanced software products group.inc, 2014; McCumber, 2005). 
Storage refers to information that is at rest. It is stored on a device or backup 
medium in any format (Advanced software products group.inc, 2014; McCumber, 
2005). 
Processing refers to information being processed by one or more applications. It 
could be updated, appended, or deleted (Advanced software products group.inc, 
2014; McCumber, 2005). 
3.4.3 Security Measures 
Security measures are employed to ensure that the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (CIA) of information assets are maintained while information is stored, 
processed or is moving between information states (McCumber, 2005). These 
security measures include technological, procedural and factors.  
Technological security measures are essential in protecting the CIA of 
information assets. These technological security measures include firewalls, 
intrusion detection systems, thumbprint scanners and many others. According to 
Whitman & Mattord (2012), if technological security measures are implemented 
correctly, they help to preserve the CIA of the organisation’s information assets. 
However, organisations should not solely rely on technological security measures 
(McCumber, 2005; SANS, 2010). 
Procedural security measures include dealing with information security policies 
and procedures. Procedural security measures define how employees in 
organisations should behave with regard to protecting information assets 
(McCumber, 2005; SANS, 2010; Whitman & Mattord, 2012). These security 
measures are important as employees need to be taught how to interact with the 
technologies in order to protect information assets. However, in order for 
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employees to be able to follow practices and procedures, they must first be made 
aware of them. 
Human factors are very important security measures. Regardless of how much 
money organisations spend on technology, humans remain the “weakest link” in 
the protection of information assets. Technological and procedural security 
measures both rely heavily on humans (Whitman & Mattord, 2012). It is, therefore, 
important that organisations focus on education, training and awareness to 
counter the human factor (Jansson, 2011). This is supported by McCumber (2005) 
who also refers to “human factors” as “education, training and awareness”. It could 
be argued that if humans are educated and trained with regard to information 
security, they could become the “strongest link” in the information security chain. 
Proper use of information security measures can prevent or minimise threats that 
are plaguing organisations. Organisations need to follow a holistic approach with 
regard to the protection of information assets. This means that organisations need 
to take into account technological, procedural and human factor security 
measures, as indicated in McCumber’s model. This holistic approach could help to 
mitigate threats within organisations (Tohidi, 2011). In order for employees to 
know how to behave (and how not to behave) with regard to information security, 
organisational information security policies need to exist.  As mentioned, policies 
are part of procedural security measures. The following section discusses the 
importance of information security policies. 
3.5  The Importance of Information Security Policies 
As seen in McCumber’s model in Figure 3.1, procedural security measures are 
important with regard to information security. Part of these procedural security 
measures are information security policies.  
An information security policy is one of the most important security measures 
needed in organisations for the overall management of information security (Höne 
& Eloff, 2002; Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016). One of the main objectives of an 
information security policy is to outline what behaviour is acceptable and what 
behaviour is unacceptable within organisations with regard to information security 
(Höne & Eloff, 2002; Thomson & Von Solms, 2005). As such, information security 
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policies are necessary as they provide guidance to employees with regard to how 
they can protect their information assets.  
For example, a policy could state that employees are prohibited from accessing 
non-secure, non-work related websites, as these untrusted websites could expose 
the organisation to attacks. If employees do not adhere to this policy rule, it could 
have disastrous consequences for the organisation no matter how much money 
the organisation has invested in technological security measures.  
Top management is responsible for the well-being of the organisation and for 
communicating a clear and concise vision for the organisation (Hu, Dinev, Hart, & 
Cooke, 2012; Thomson & Von Solms, 2006; Von Solms & Von Solms, 2004). 
Essentially, top management should not only express the values and beliefs of the 
organisation in their policy, but should also lead by example in complying with all 
organisational policies. Information security policies are typically put in place to 
guide the behaviour of employees with regard to information security. Ultimately, 
the behaviour of these employees should lead to the cultivation of an information 
security culture where the protection of information assets is the norm within the 
organisation. Information security culture is further discussed in Chapter 5, Section 
5.7. 
Furthermore, management should ensure that employees are aware of these 
policies and that they adhere to them, so as to ensure the protection of their 
information assets and in order to minimise risk. Ultimately, information security 
should be managed holistically to minimise information security risk. As such, it is 
important that risk management is practised in order to protect information assets 
from risk appropriately and efficiently. The following section discusses managing 
information security risk. 
3.6  Managing Information Security Risk 
In order for organisations to protect information assets, risk management needs to 
occur. Von Solms and Von Solms (2009) state that risk management is “the 
process to identify and assess all potential risks as well as introducing security 
measures that should mitigate all these risks to acceptable low levels”. ISO/IEC 
27005 (2011) refers to risk management as “the coordinated activities to direct and 
control an organisation with regard to risk”.   
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Security risks could be present in an organisation’s information systems owing to 
technological failures, system vulnerabilities, human failures, fraud or external 
events (Bojanc & Jerman-Blažič, 2008). A risk normally constitutes an asset, a 
threat, and a vulnerability. A threat can attack an information asset through a 
vulnerability. The management of risk relating to the organisation’s information 
systems is important to ensure that the strategic objectives of the organisation are 
not jeopardised and to ensure that the information assets are not compromised 
(Von Solms & Von Solms, 2009). 
A risk management approach typically includes risk assessment, consisting of risk 
analysis and evaluation, and risk treatment (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2009). 
Landoll (2011) suggests that a security risk assessment evaluates the threat 
environment of the organisation. Once the risk assessment activities have been 
completed, risk treatment should occur. Risk treatment is essentially the mitigation 
of risk (ISO/IEC 27005, 2011). Risk treatment consists of two main functions: 
firstly, identifying suitable security measures to prevent threats from occurring, and 
secondly, implementing identified security measures so that identified threats do 
not materialise (ISO/IEC 27005, 2011; Von Solms & Von Solms, 2009). Security 
efforts should address risk management in an effective manner where and when 
needed (ISO/IEC 27005, 2011). Risk management is a critical process in the 
protection of information assets. In order to mitigate or control risk, appropriate 
security measures should be put in place including effective information security 
policies.  
There are many standards and best practices available to provide guidance to 
organisations with regard to managing their information security risks. These are 
discussed in the following section. 
3.7  Information Security Standards and Best Practices 
The aim of many standards and best practices is to guide the information security 
management in organisations. Reputable role players such as the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the International Organisation for 
Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
provide such standards and best practices.   
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Table 3.2 illustrates the most relevant information security standards and best 
practices that were identified through a literature review. These five publications 
are of special interest to this research as they emphasise the importance of 
education and they also highlight human behaviour as a potential threat to 
information security. 
Publication Title Education Human 
Aspect 
(Behaviour) 
ISO/IEC 
27001:2013 
Information technology- 
Security techniques-
Information security 
management systems- 
Requirements  
x  
ISO/IEC 27005: 
2011 
Information technology-
Security techniques- 
Information security risk 
management 
 x 
NIST SP 800-16: 
2013 
Information technology 
security training 
requirements: A role and 
performance based model 
x x 
NIST SP 800-50: 
2003 
Building an information 
technology security 
awareness and training 
programme 
x x 
NIST SP 800-100: 
2006 
Information security 
handbook: A guide for 
managers 
x x 
Table 3.2: Information security standards and best practices 
As shown in Table 3.2, ISO/IEC 27001 mentions education, while ISO/IEC 27005 
only mentions human aspects. However, the NIST publications mention both 
education and human aspects. These information security standards and best 
practices are further discussed below.  
3.7.1 ISO/IEC 27001 (2013) 
This document provides a model for establishing, implementing, operating, 
monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving an information security 
management system (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). Section 7.2 (b) states that 
organisations need to “ensure that employees are competent on the basis of 
appropriate education, training and experience” (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). This 
supports the need for employees that are educated with regard to information 
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security, which could result in the protection of an organisation’s information 
assets. This is further underpinned in Section A.7.2.2 which states that “all 
employees of the organisation, and, where relevant, contractors, shall receive 
appropriate awareness, education and training and regular updates in 
organisational policies and procedures, as relevant for their job function” (ISO/IEC 
27001, 2013). 
3.7.2 ISO/IEC 27005 (2011) 
This document provides guidelines for information security risk management in an 
organisation. Annex C of the standard refers to examples of typical threats, where 
they state that “particular attention should be placed on human threats, particularly 
insiders”. Furthermore, it provides a list of insider actions that could accidentally 
damage information assets (ISO/IEC 27005, 2011). This could possibly be due to 
a lack of education or ineffective policies. This document reiterates the notion that 
human behaviour poses significant risk to information assets. 
3.7.3 NIST 800-16 (2013) 
This document presents a revised conceptual framework for providing information 
security training. Section 1.2 of NIST 800-16 (2013) briefly mentions that the CIA 
of information assets cannot be ensured unless each employee understands their 
roles and responsibilities and is adequately educated and trained to perform them 
(NIST 800-16, 2013). This highlights the need for employees to be educated in 
order to protect information assets. Section 2.2 of NIST 800-16 (2013) further 
mentions the relationship between awareness, training and education and the 
importance of each. 
3.7.4 NIST 800-50 (2003) 
This document provides guidelines for building and maintaining a comprehensive 
awareness programme, as part of an organisation’s IT security programme (NIST 
800-50, 2003). According to Section 1 of NIST 800-50 (2003), the “human factor”, 
not technology, is the key, but is also the “weakest link” when it comes to the 
protection of information assets. Therefore, they need to have adequate 
information security education to be able to protect the IT resources they are 
responsible for. Section 2 of NIST 800-50 (2003) also makes reference to the 
importance of awareness, education and training. 
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3.7.5 NIST 800-100 (2006) 
This document provides a broad overview of information security programme 
elements to assist managers in understanding how to establish and implement an 
information security programme (NIST 800-100, 2006). Section 2.2.3.5 of NIST 
800-100 (2006) states that all persons in an organisation have a role to play in 
protecting information assets. This is supported in Section 4 of this document that 
mentions the importance of awareness, education and training (NIST 800-100, 
2006). 
The aforementioned standards and best practices provide support to this research 
as they highlight the important relationship between education and human 
behaviour. If employees are aware of threats and vulnerabilities, and they are 
educated on how to configure, operate and maintain technological and procedural 
security measures correctly, they could be the strongest link when it comes to 
protecting information assets. Therefore, it could be argued that information 
security education could influence the information security behaviour of employees 
positively. In terms of this research, the focus is on higher education institutions 
and the factors of information security, with a specific focus on influencing the 
information security behaviour of computing graduates.  
3.8  Conclusion 
Information is considered to be the lifeblood of modern organisations. This means 
that organisations cannot provide vital services to their customers without 
information. As such, the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information 
need to be protected. However, information, whether in storage, transmission or 
processing, is constantly facing threats.  
Organisations can face dire consequences if they do not manage the risk relating 
to information security adequately. A structured process such as risk management 
should be established to mitigate risks that threaten organisational information 
assets. Risk management includes identifying risk and relevant security measures 
to mitigate those risks.  
Security measures include technical, procedural and human factor security 
measures. Technological and procedural security measures are largely dependent 
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on human factors. Therefore, it is important to identify factors that could influence 
the information security behaviour in order to address the human factor.  
One of the key factors discussed in this chapter is policies.  It is the responsibility 
of top management to express what the acceptable behaviour and what the 
unacceptable behaviour is with regard to information security through an 
information security policy. Information security policies are important as they 
provide guidance on how to preserve the CIA of information assets. However, 
without education and employees understanding the importance of information 
security policies, these information security policies will have no influence on the 
employees’ behaviour. In the same way that information security policies shape 
and guide the information security behaviour of employees within organisations, 
higher education institutions should also have information security policies to 
provide guidance to computing graduates with regard to information security 
behaviour. Therefore, information security policies are identified as one of the 
factors that could possibly influence the information security behaviour of 
computing graduates. 
The following chapter discusses information security education and its relevance 
to this research.  
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 4: Information Security in Higher Education 
4.1 Introduction  
The ubiquitous use of Information Technology (IT) and the internet has become an 
integral part of many organisations. Sensitive and critical information assets are 
stored, processed, and transmitted using these technologies (ISO/IEC 27001, 
2013; Yoon, Hwang, & Kim, 2012). With such a dependency on IT and the 
internet, information assets are exposed to various threats.  
While technological solutions are important in guarding information assets, the 
humans that configure, operate and maintain them should be educated (NIST 800-
50, 2003). However, even though education should be one of the most basic 
methods of defence against threats, it is often overlooked. It is important for 
organisations to have employees who are aware of and educated about threats to 
information assets and how to safeguard against these potential threats. Raising 
awareness and educating users about emergent threats, is an essential precaution 
in protecting information assets (Abawajy, 2014; Parmar, 2013).  
The majority of security breaches are caused by uneducated or ignorant users 
(Landoll, 2011; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2016). If users do not know how to 
configure, operate and maintain technological and procedural security measures, 
then they cannot ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information 
assets. This is further supported by Section 1 of NIST 800-50 (2003), which states 
that users need to have adequate information security knowledge to be able to 
protect information assets. Chapter 3, Section 3.7 discusses various other 
information security standards and best practices that support the need for 
information security education.   
This chapter highlights the need for information security education in Section 4.2, 
followed by a comparison of information security awareness, training and 
education in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 briefly discusses the Association for 
Computing Machinery (ACM) computing curricular guidelines, as they relate to 
information security, followed by Section 4.5 which discusses knowledge creation 
and its relevance to information security education. Finally, the chapter concludes 
in Section 4.6. 
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4.2 The Need for Information Security Education 
Online criminals often target uneducated or unaware users to breach the security 
of organisations. Therefore, the education of users is one of the most critical 
elements in the first line defence against malicious attacks. If users are educated 
about how to protect organisational information assets, this could help to mitigate 
the impact and occurrence of information security breaches (Hentea et al., 2006). 
Researchers argue that there is an urgent need to increase the number of 
computing graduates who are information security conscious significantly in this 
growing information based economy. In addition, there should be a better 
alignment between information security industry needs and what is taught in 
higher education institutions. Higher education institutions need to integrate 
information security into undergraduate curricula to target computing students from 
an early stage in their education (Conklin, Cline Jr., & Roosa, 2014; Dark & Davis, 
2003). 
Furthermore, Furnell and Clarke (2012) are of the opinion that it is necessary for 
information security awareness to be an integral part of academic education. The 
academic aspect is relevant as students will be exposed to information security 
principles at an early stage of their studies, which could be valuable in teaching 
them about threats and safeguards. Information security education should allow 
for the integration of various information security principles (Lee, Lee, & Kim, 
2016).  
Information security education should be offered at undergraduate, graduate and 
postgraduate levels at all academic institutions to help cope with the prevailing 
information security problems plaguing organisations (Futcher, Schroder, & Von 
Solms, 2010). Furthermore, computing graduates entering the work environment 
should be educated about information security principles (Caldwell, 2013; Futcher, 
Schroder, & Von Solms, 2010). These computing graduates would, for example, 
typically be employed as information system analysts, software developers, 
network specialists, and database administrators. As such, they would 
continuously interact with information assets and information systems. Information 
security education should, therefore, teach these computing students the 
fundamental information security principles they need in order to preserve and 
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protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of an organisation’s information 
assets (Florentine, 2014; Pratt, 2014). In addition, they could impart this acquired 
information security knowledge to their colleagues in the work place. Ultimately, 
these computing graduates could become information security champions within 
organisations. The following section provides a clear distinction between 
information security awareness, training and education. 
4.3 Information Security Awareness, Training and Education 
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “learning 
is a continuum; that starts with awareness, builds to training, and evolves into 
education” (NIST 800-50, 2003). Information security awareness has a short-term 
impact in comparison to that of training and education. Awareness efforts are 
generally aimed at influencing information security behaviour or at reinforcing good 
information security practices. Its purpose is to focus attention on information 
security by addressing the “what” question. Information security training, on the 
other hand, is aimed at producing practical and required security skills to 
safeguard against security threats. Training addresses the “how” question through 
practical instruction. By contrast, information security education answers the “why” 
question. Education is long-term and often involves theoretical concepts and 
instruction (Futcher, 2011; NIST 800-50, 2003). The focus of this research is 
particularly on information security education and how it can be used to influence 
the information security behaviour of computing graduates. 
FRAMEWORK AWARENESS TRAINING EDUCATION 
Attribute ‘What’ ‘How ‘ ‘Why’ 
Level Information Knowledge Insight 
Learning 
objective 
Recognition 
and 
Retention 
Skill Understanding 
Example 
teaching 
method 
Media Practical 
Instruction 
Theoretical 
Instruction 
Test Measure Identify 
learning 
Apply learning Interpret 
learning 
Impact time-
frame 
Short-term Intermediate Long-term 
Table 4.1: Awareness, training and education comparative framework (de Zafra, 
1991 cited in NIST 800-50, 2003) 
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Table 4.1 shows the comparison between awareness, training and education.  The 
following subsections discuss these concepts in more detail. 
4.3.1 Information Security Awareness 
According to NIST 800-16 (2013), “awareness is not training. The purpose of 
awareness presentations is to focus attention on security. Awareness 
presentations are intended to allow individuals to recognise IT security concerns 
and respond accordingly”. As mentioned, awareness is aimed at addressing the 
“what” question, primarily using media such as posters, emails, videos, and 
newsletters. It is important to highlight that awareness has a short-term impact. 
The learning objective for awareness is to enhance recognition and retention of 
information. Awareness should target all users and should be designed to change 
user behaviour and to reinforce good security practices (NIST 800-50, 2003).  
An example of awareness with regard to this research would be posters with 
information regarding various information security principles posted in laboratories, 
corridors and lecture venues. Another example would be videos shown during 
lectures, or emails sent to students to warn them of emergent information security 
threats and how to safeguard against them.  
4.3.2 Information Security Training 
Training is defined in NIST 800-16 (2013) as follows: “the level of the learning 
continuum that strives to produce relevant and needed security skills and 
competencies”. This definition highlights the fact that training uses a more practical 
method of instruction based on knowledge and application of the “how” question. 
Training has an intermediate impact. The most significant difference between 
training and awareness is that training seeks to develop skills while awareness 
focuses attention on a particular topic (NIST 800-50, 2003). 
A practical example of training in higher education institutions would be when 
computing students incorporate information security principles such as password 
protection or identification and authentication into their development projects. A 
further example is teaching students how to use and to implement firewalls, anti-
virus software or any other technical security measures during their practical or 
tutorial classes.  
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4.3.3 Information Security Education 
NIST 800-16 (2013) defines education as “the level that integrates all of the 
security skills and competencies of the various functional specialities into a 
common body of knowledge, adds a multidisciplinary study of concepts, issues, 
and principles (technological and social), and strives to produce IT security 
specialists and professionals capable of vision and proactive response”. Education 
is intended to have a long-term impact on users with theoretical instruction being 
used to gain an understanding and deeper insight into a particular knowledge area 
in order to be able to interpret the “why” question (Futcher, 2011; NIST 800-50, 
2003). 
An example of education in higher education institutions is computing degree 
programmes or national diplomas. Computing students should be taught various 
information security principles through lectures, practical classes and 
presentations. If computing graduates are educated regarding the dangers that 
threaten information assets, and they are equipped with the necessary skills to 
safeguard against these dangers, this could help to mitigate some of the 
associated risk. As highlighted in Chapter 3, Section 3.7, various standards and 
best practices indicate that humans pose significant risk to organisational 
information assets. They also stress the importance of awareness, training and 
education to influence the behaviour of humans (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013; NIST 800-
16, 2013; NIST 800-50, 2003). Information security education is, therefore, 
considered one of the human factors that could influence the information security 
behaviour of computing graduates. 
Based on the discussion of the relationship between awareness, training and 
education, it is evident that they are somewhat interdependent. Computing 
students should be made aware of the threats associated with information security 
throughout their studies. Furthermore, they need the knowledge, insight or skills 
that will enable them to safeguard against such threats. It is important that 
information security education addresses “what” information security principles are 
important, “how” to apply them and “why” they are important (Futcher, 2011). 
NIST 800-50 (2003) guidelines are helpful in explaining awareness, training and 
education and the difference between the three concepts. However, the guidelines 
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are specifically aimed towards the needs of federal agencies and organisations 
(NIST 800-50, 2003). Therefore, they do not necessarily meet the needs of higher 
education institutions. The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) provides 
various computing curricular guidelines which are discussed in the following 
section. 
4.4 ACM CS/IS/IT Curricular Guidelines 
The ACM is the world's largest educational and scientific computing society 
delivering resources that advance computing as a science and as a profession. 
The ACM provides the computing field's premier Digital Library and serves its 
members and the computing profession with cutting-edge publications, 
conferences, and career resources. Furthermore, the ACM provides the various 
computing fields with curricular guidelines (ACM, 2016). According to the ACM, 
Information Assurance and Security (IAS) should be a very important part of 
computing curricula. IAS is defined as “a set of security measures and processes, 
both technical and policy, intended to protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and 
by providing for authentication and non-repudiation”. Assurance warrants that 
these processes and information are valid, while security ensures that these 
processes and information are protected (Committee on National Security 
Systems, 2010). In order for IAS to deliver on its promise to protect information 
and information systems, effective IAS education, both in the classroom 
(undergraduate and postgraduate) and beyond, is essential. This is important, as 
there is a growing need for computing graduates who are information security 
conscious (Futcher & Van Niekerk, 2013; Manson, Curl, & Torner, 2009). 
The ACM curricular guidelines for both Information Technology (IT) and 
Computing Science (CS) describe IAS as an integrative knowledge area that 
should be pervasive throughout other knowledge areas. Pervasive, in this context, 
is defined as “existing in all parts of a place or thing; spreading gradually to affect 
all parts of a place or thing” (Oxford Dictionary, 2015).  It must be noted that 
although the ACM defines IAS as a pervasive theme, it also states that IAS 
belongs at the advanced level of a four-year IT program. However, some 
computing students may not get the chance to complete a fourth year of study. 
This would mean that these computing students may never encounter IAS, or 
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information security education, if information security is not pervasively integrated 
from the first year of their studies.  
The ACM Information Systems (IS) guidelines refer to IAS as IT security and risk 
management. It also states that this is an elective course. More emphasis should 
be placed on IAS to ensure that it permeates undergraduate programs; not as a 
stand-alone course, but rather as a “pervasive” theme, in order to cultivate an 
information security conscious workforce in future (ACM, 2013; Lunt et al., 2008; 
Topi et al., 2010). For information security to become pervasive, relevant 
principles could be taught, to some extent, in most of the modules of the main 
curriculum from first year through to the final year (Lunt et al., 2008). In addition, 
core security principles should be identified and pervasively integrated into 
undergraduate computing curricula. This does not mean, however, that each 
individual module needs to handle all the core information security principles. Each 
module should incorporate those most relevant to the module, through examples 
and scenarios. 
Futcher and Van Niekerk (2013) argue that although the ACM does provide 
guidelines for computing curricula, these guidelines do not stipulate the 
fundamental information security principles or the sequence in which they should 
be taught. This presents a situation where different higher education institutions 
are creating different education models based on their interpretation of these 
curricular recommendations.  
It is important for higher education institutions to provide computing students with 
the necessary information security education at an early stage of their studies. 
This could increase the likelihood of producing computing graduates who would 
have the necessary background needed to design, develop and maintain 
information systems that are trustworthy and secure. This is critical for preparing 
these computing graduates for jobs where they will be interacting with information 
assets and information systems (Hentea et al., 2006; Irvine, Chin, & Frincke, 
1998). Additionally, these computing graduates could become information security 
champions within organisations. 
Computing students often need to be educated in order for them to be convinced 
to demonstrate new behaviour patterns. Therefore, information security education 
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is necessary to ensure that computing graduates have the required knowledge in 
order for them to behave in a secure manner (Okere et al., 2012; Schein, 1999).  
Higher education institutions play a pivotal role in educating computing graduates 
about information security, thereby influencing their information security behaviour 
(Mcgettrick, 2013). Many higher education institutions have made advances in 
implementing information security in postgraduate qualifications; however, there is 
still a need for pervasive information security in undergraduate computing curricula 
(Futcher et al., 2010). Undergraduate computing modules should focus on the 
creation of relevant information security knowledge in order to gain an 
understanding of the underlying issues relating to information security.  
4.5 Knowledge Creation 
In order for an individual to become knowledgeable or educated about something, 
knowledge creation must take place. Nonaka (1994) highlights the knowledge 
creation process and two types of knowledge, namely explicit knowledge and tacit 
knowledge.  Explicit knowledge is objective and it can be expressed in words, for 
example, policies in computing laboratories and the content in computing curricula. 
Conversely, tacit knowledge is subjective and is difficult to formalise and 
communicate. It is rooted in action, commitment and involvement. Tacit knowledge 
comprises, for example, beliefs, assumptions, norms, and attitudes as well as 
skills. There are four identified relationships that exist between explicit and tacit 
knowledge that are referred to as Nonaka's Modes of Knowledge Creation. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the Modes of Knowledge Creation which include 
Externalisation, combination, Internalisation, and Socialisation (Nonaka, 1994). 
Externalisation is the conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. This 
means that the beliefs and principles of an organisation are expressed verbally or 
in written form. Externalisation can be articulated through dialogue between 
individuals or through policies (Nonaka, 1994). Combination is the process of 
transferring explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge. This means that knowledge 
can be transferred between groups.  
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Figure 4.1: Modes of Knowledge Creation (Nonaka, 1994) 
Explicit knowledge can be communicated, for example, through policies, posters, 
emails, and presentations (Nonaka, 1994). Education would be used specifically 
as a form of combination. Internalisation transforms explicit knowledge into tacit 
knowledge. For example, values and beliefs explicitly expressed in policies, which 
the individual has to comprehend and comply with, are converted into the 
individual’s tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994). Socialisation is the mode where tacit 
knowledge is converted into tacit knowledge via the interaction of individuals. 
Socialisation is the result of non-verbal communication and the interaction of 
individuals. An individual can absorb another individual’s tacit knowledge through 
observation and practice without articulating verbally.  Experience is vital to 
obtaining tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994).  In terms of information security, 
knowledge will also need to be communicated to computing students in order for 
them to learn about various information security principles. This knowledge could 
influence the information security behaviour of these computing students (Guo, 
2013a; Muhire, 2012; Schein, 1999; Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2005).  
An example could be that of knowledge relating to password security that would 
be important for computing students. This knowledge would need to be included in 
the curricular guidelines representing the tacit knowledge that has been 
externalised into explicit knowledge. This is the externalisation process. This 
password knowledge would then be transferred into the explicit knowledge of the 
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computing students when they are taught various modules. This is where the 
pervasiveness of information security throughout computing curricula is 
imperative. This password knowledge would not only be taught in a security 
related module, but would be emphasised in multiple modules as being significant. 
This explicit password knowledge could include the importance of password 
security; how to create strong passwords and how to protect one’s password. This 
process is referred to as the combination process.  
The computing students then internalise this explicit knowledge into tacit 
knowledge through practical experience and further understanding. In their 
practical classes, they could practise how to set up a good password. With enough 
practice, password protection could become second nature to these students. This 
knowledge could change the attitudes positively, which could influence the 
behaviour of computing students. With the socialisation of computing students and 
educators, the process of tacit knowledge being transferred into tacit knowledge 
occurs. Computing students would observe and mimic how their educators and 
peers behave with regard to password security. The ideal environment would be 
one where the protection of information assets is second nature to computing 
students. 
As mentioned in Section 4.3, learning is a continuum that starts with awareness 
and ultimately evolves into education. As such, interdependency exists between 
awareness, training and education. As referred to in Table 4.1, training is 
important in the creation of knowledge. This can be achieved through 
externalisation and combination.  However, education goes deeper in terms of 
translating knowledge into insight through internalisation. Internalisation of this 
information security knowledge through understanding and insight is important as 
it could possibly influence the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates. 
4.6 Conclusion 
It has been established that information is an important business asset that needs 
to be protected. However, it would be beneficial for computing graduates to 
understand why they need to protect information assets, and how to do so. That is 
where information security education plays an important role.  
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Information security knowledge and principles should be externalised by the 
computing department. For computing graduates, this information security 
knowledge should, ideally, be communicated in their undergraduate computing 
curricula as part of their studies; communicated through the knowledge creation 
process of combination. This information security knowledge needs to be 
internalised in order for it to affect the behaviour of these computing graduates. 
However, for information security knowledge and practices to become part of the 
behaviour of computing graduates, it is argued that an isolated information security 
related module is not sufficient. Communicating information security knowledge 
and practices to computing graduates at an early stage of their higher education 
will be valuable in teaching key messages about information security threats and 
safeguards. Through the internalisation of this knowledge, information security 
could become second nature to these computing graduates when they enter the 
workplace. Various security measures as mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3 
are employed to ensure the CIA of information assets. However, humans need to 
be educated on how to configure, operate and maintain technological and 
procedural security measures. 
When these graduates become employees in the workplace, they could help to 
protect the information assets within organisations. Therefore, information security 
education is identified as one of the factors that could influence the information 
security behaviour of computing graduates positively. The next chapter will provide 
an overview of information security behaviour. 
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 5: Information Security Behaviour 
5.1  Introduction 
Owing to the increase in security breaches, organisations are paying more 
attention to the human aspects of information security. This is mainly due to the 
fact that criminals are using various attacks to target the users of information 
systems. Often the success of information security is dependent on the effective 
behaviour of employees who interact with these information assets and 
information systems. An information security conscious workforce is an integral 
part of ensuring effective information security (Huang, Rau, & Salvendy, 2010; 
Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Stanton, Mastrangelo, Stam, & Jolton, 2004). 
The behaviour of employees has become a very important topic in information 
security. Employees operate technological and physical security measures. Thus, 
it is very important to understand how behaviour may impact on the protection of 
information assets. There is a general consensus in literature that employee 
behaviour poses significant risk in the protection of information assets. It is also 
acknowledged, however, that if employees behave in a secure manner, this could 
lead to the successful protection of information assets (Alhogail & Mirza, 2014; 
Thomson & Von Solms, 2006; Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010). Although 
organisations invest a great deal in new technology in an effort to try to protect 
their information assets, organisations should focus more on employee behaviour 
and should find ways in which they can influence this behaviour positively to 
ensure that information security becomes second nature to their employees 
(Blythe, 2013).   
The behaviour of employees is critical in ensuring the protection of information 
assets. While the focus of much information security literature is on organisations, 
the focus of this research is on higher education institutions and the factors of 
information security, with a specific focus on influencing information security 
behaviour.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 highlights human 
aspects of information security behaviour in organisations. Section 5.3 discusses 
human behaviour in general. Section 5.4 presents various behavioural theories, 
while Section 5.5 presents a discussion on various factors that influence 
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behaviour. Section 5.6 identifies and discusses different information security 
behaviours. Section 5.7 follows with a discussion on information security culture 
and the chapter concludes with Section 5.8.    
5.2 Human Aspects of Information Security 
Information is used to drive most modern organisations and it is used to gain a 
competitive edge over competitors. Thus, it is critically important to protect it. 
Information security measures that address the human factor are just as important 
as technological and procedural security measures in the protection of an 
organisation’s information assets (Da Veiga & Martins, 2015a; Von Solms & Von 
Solms, 2006). It is important to note that this section focuses on human aspects of 
information security in organisations. 
As stated in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3, information security measures that address 
the human factor underpin technological and procedural security measures. 
Therefore, it is important that employees are educated on how to implement 
technological and procedural security measures in order to mitigate threats. 
Management usually communicates rules and regulations with regard to 
information security through policies. Information security policies should be based 
on industry best practices that meet the policy and regulatory requirements of the 
organisation. These information security policies should outline what the 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour is with regard to information security as 
discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.5 (Chen & Li, 2014; Thomson & Von Solms, 
2006). Even with policies in place, information security breaches are still plaguing 
organisations, often due to the vulnerabilities that employees present. Despite the 
possible intention to comply with these information security policies, employees 
still remain a threat as their actual information security behaviour may differ from 
their intended behaviour. Employee behaviour that results in security breaches 
could be as a result of negligence, error or deliberate malicious attack (Da Veiga & 
Martins, 2015b;  Shropshire & Warkentin, 2015). 
Many employees may not have the necessary level of knowledge or capability to 
protect themselves and the organisation from online threats. Furthermore, they 
may not be equipped to operate the technology to safeguard against these threats. 
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Thus, it is important that employees are educated with regard to protecting 
information assets (Furnell & Clarke, 2012).  
Organisations should ideally focus on the information security behaviour of 
employees as the risk of security breaches may affect their reputations 
significantly as well as incurring extra costs for their organisations (Ahmad, 
Hadgkiss, & Ruighaver, 2012; Safa & Ismail, 2013).  The ideal situation would be 
one where employees display acceptable information security behaviour in order 
to mitigate the risks associated with information security in organisations. Proper 
information security behaviour combined with technological and physical security 
measures could help to protect organisations effectively against malicious attacks 
(Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Ifinedo, 2012). Just as it is important for employees to 
protect information assets within organisations, so it should be for computing 
graduates to protect information assets within higher education institutions. 
Therefore, in the same way that organisations should focus on the information 
security behaviour of their employees, higher education institutions should focus 
on influencing the information security behaviour of computing graduates. 
However, in order to understand information security behaviour, it is important to 
understand human behaviour in general. 
5.3 Human Behaviour 
According to Davinson & Sillence (2010), practising secure behaviour is affected 
by the presence of a perceived threat and whether implementing secure behaviour 
will reduce that threat. However, before secure behaviour is discussed, behaviour 
should be defined. Behaviour is defined as “the way in which an animal or 
person reacts in response to a particular situation or stimulus” (Oxford Dictionary, 
2015). 
Explaining human behaviour in all its complexity is a very difficult task as humans 
are multifaceted (Ajzen, 1991). Human behaviour is influenced by personal factors 
such as intentions, beliefs, attitudes, and self-efficacy. It is also influenced by 
environmental factors such as social norms and culture. Schein (1999) defines 
culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solves 
its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the 
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correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems”. This 
definition highlights that culture is socially learned and transmitted by people and it 
provides the rules for behaviour. It can influence the attitudes and behaviours of 
people (Tsai, 2011). Culture will be discussed in Section 5.7. 
Different situations and environments may call for people to change their 
behaviours. The key to influencing behaviour is to replace the bad or ineffective 
behaviour with the required good behaviour (Milliken, 1987). Desirable behaviour 
is formed through shaping. Shaping could be, for example, through learning, 
observation, training and imitating (Stoudemire, 1994). 
The predecessor of behavioural change, however, is the will or intention to change 
behaviour. Behaviour can be shaped and controlled either by personal influences 
or by environmental influences, or both (Wood & Bandura, 1989). Behavioural 
intentions represent an individual’s attempt to achieve a desired goal or behaviour 
(Verplanken & Faes, 1999). However, intentions do not always lead to behaviour 
change (Verplanken & Faes, 1999).   
To have a better understanding of what influences people to behave the way they 
do in certain situations, it is important to look at existing behavioural theories. 
5.4 Behavioural Theories 
Many behavioural theories exist in an attempt to explain why humans behave the 
way they do. Each theory focuses on different factors in order to explain the 
behaviour of people. While many behavioural theories exist, the theories that are 
used in this research include the Theory of Planned Behaviour, Protection 
Motivation Theory and the Social Cognitive Theory. Each of these theories is 
briefly discussed in the following subsections. 
5.4.1 Theory of Planned Behaviour 
The Theory of Planned Behaviour explains the links between various concepts 
that could influence behaviour. As the name suggests, this theory helps to predict 
the deliberate behaviour of people because behaviour can be planned (Ajzen, 
1991). The Theory of Planned Behaviour has been widely used in investigating 
ethical behaviours when using information systems and the decisions of 
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individuals to adopt acceptable computer or information security measures 
(Ifinedo, 2012). 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the Theory of Planned Behaviour components that could 
influence the behaviour of people. 
 
Figure 5.1: The Theory of Planned Behaviour (adapted from Ajzen, 1991) 
According to this theory, attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural 
control all influence a person’s intention, which ultimately could determine their 
behaviour. Attitude is concerned with the person’s feelings and beliefs. The 
possibility of a person’s adhering to the correct behaviour is greater with a positive 
attitude towards said behaviour. Subjective norms are perceptions and 
expectations that a person has about the people and the environment around him, 
for example, social groups (Ajzen, 1991). Perceived behavioural control is 
concerned with the perceived capability of an individual to execute the required 
behavioural change. Intention represents a person’s willingness to achieve the 
required behaviour influenced by attitude, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioural control (Ajzen, 1991). The arrows in the diagram represent influence, 
for example, perceived behavioural control can influence intention, which then 
influences behaviour. It is important to note that intention does not always yield the 
required behaviour.  
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In terms of this research, the Theory of Planned Behaviour provides a strong 
foundation for influencing the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates. All the Theory of Planned Behaviour components are identified as 
factors that could influence behaviour. 
5.4.2 Protection Motivation Theory 
The Protection Motivation Theory is considered to be one of the leading theories in 
the area of health behaviour motivation. This theory has been extended to various 
other fields of research. It is widely used as an explanatory theory to predict 
individual intentions to take precautionary or protective measures when faced with 
threats (Safa & Von Solms, 2016; Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnila, 2014; Yoon, 
Hwang, & Kim, 2012).  
 
Figure 5.2: Protection Motivation Theory (adapted from Maddux & Rogers, 1983) 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the Protection Motivation Theory. This theory involves threat 
appraisals and coping appraisals based on an individual’s experience when faced 
with a threat (Siponen et al., 2014; Yoon et al., 2012). Threat appraisal refers to 
the process of evaluating a fear that occurs owing to an individual’s perceived 
threat in a particular situation. Threat appraisal is a summation of the following: 
perceived vulnerability and perceived severity minus rewards. Perceived 
vulnerability refers to the perceived extent to which an individual is susceptible to 
threats. Perceived severity refers to the perceived impact that the threat poses. 
Rewards refer to the potential rewards that individuals expect to receive for 
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adhering to the correct behaviour  (Posey, Roberts, Lowry, & Hightower, 2014; 
Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012).  
The coping appraisal process evaluates an individual’s ability or efficacy to cope 
with threats. Coping appraisals is a summation of the following: response cost 
minus response efficacy and self-efficacy. Response cost refers to potential costs, 
i.e. time, effort, money incurred with implementing protective behaviour (Ifinedo, 
2014; Posey et al., 2014).  Response efficacy refers to an individual’s belief in 
whether the security measures they implement are effective in mitigating threats. 
Self-efficacy refers to an individual’s perceived capability to implement the 
necessary protective behaviour (Vance et al., 2012; Yoon et al., 2012).   
Self-efficacy can be likened to perceived behavioural control in the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour. According to Siponen et al. (2014), self-efficacy is the most 
significant predictor of intention to comply with protective behaviour. Within the 
context of information security, it is important that computing graduates are able to 
implement the correct information security measures in order to reduce the 
vulnerabilities that they present, thereby mitigating potential threats.  
In terms of this research, perceived vulnerability, perceived severity and self-
efficacy are identified as key factors that could influence information security 
behaviour. 
5.4.3 Social Cognitive Theory 
The Social Cognitive Theory explains how people acquire and maintain certain 
behavioural patterns. According to the theory, evaluating behavioural change 
depends on personal factors, environmental factors and behavioural factors. 
Social Cognitive Theory is used in psychology education, health and 
communication (Wood & Bandura, 1989).  
According to Bandura (1988), an individual’s beliefs, attitudes and emotions are 
developed and influenced through modelling, outcome expectancy, self-efficacy 
and identification. Modelling refers to individuals learning from a model. A model 
could, for example, be an educator, a peer or a parent. Outcome expectancy 
refers to the perceived outcome of performing a particular behaviour. Self-efficacy 
refers to one’s perceived capability of performing a behaviour. Identification allows 
the observer to feel a one-to-one similarity with a model. People are more likely to 
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follow behaviours modelled by people with whom they can identify. In terms of this 
research, modelling, outcome expectancy, self-efficacy and identification are 
identified as key factors that could influence information security behaviour. 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the Social Cognitive Theory model, otherwise known as 
reciprocal determinism. In this model, personal, behavioural and environmental 
factors operate as interacting determinants that influence each other bi-
directionally. This does not mean that each of these reciprocal relationships is of 
equal strength, nor do they occur simultaneously. For example, although all three 
factors might be present at a particular time, it does not mean that they exert equal 
and simultaneous influence on an individual (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1986; Wood & 
Bandura, 1989).  
 
Figure 5.3: Social Cognitive Theory (Wood & Bandura, 1989) 
The personal factors to behavioural factors reciprocal causation relationship 
reflects the bi-directional interaction between thoughts and action. What people 
think, believe and feel affects how they behave. Conversely, how an individual 
behaves may, in turn, influence how they think, believe and feel (Wood & Bandura, 
1989). 
The behavioural factors to environmental factors reciprocal causation relationship 
represents the bi-directional interaction between action and the environment, in 
other words, social and physical. In everyday life, behaviour could alter 
environmental factors and environmental factors could alter behaviour (Wood & 
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Bandura, 1989). For example, the behaviour of employees could influence the 
culture of an organisation and vice versa. 
The environmental factors to personal factors reciprocal causation relationship is 
concerned with the interactive relationship between personal characteristics and 
environmental factors (Wood & Bandura, 1989).  
The theoretical components from the aforementioned theories have provided this 
research with factors that could influence the behaviour of computing graduates. 
The factors that have been identified to influence behaviour will be used to argue 
towards the proposed model, which will be discussed in Chapter 7. The following 
section discusses the identified factors that could influence behaviour.  
5.5  Factors that Could Influence Behaviour 
This section presents the identified factors that could influence behaviour. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, Section 1.3, in terms of this research, factors refer to any 
factors that could indirectly or directly influence human behaviour. For example, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, education plays an important role in providing 
people with the knowledge and insight necessary to change their behaviour. The 
factors listed below are the factors that have been identified as the most relevant 
for this research.  
Personal factors include: 
 Attitude 
 Perceived behavioural control 
 Self-efficacy 
 Perceived vulnerability 
 Perceived severity 
 Outcome expectancy 
Environmental factors include: 
 Subjective norms 
 Modelling 
 Identification 
 Culture 
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 Policies 
 Education 
Chapter 3, Section 3.4 discusses security measures that form part of McCumber’s 
model. These security measures include human factors, procedural and 
technological security measures. Human factors can be likened to personal factors 
and behavioural factors in the Social Cognitive Theory as discussed in Section 
5.4.3. Similarly, procedural and technological factors can be likened to 
environmental factors in the Social Cognitive Theory. 
A more detailed discussion of the interaction of these factors is presented in 
Chapter 7, Section 7.3. The following section focuses specifically on different 
information security behaviours. 
5.6  Information Security Behaviour 
Information security is not solely a problem of technology, but more often than not, 
it is a human problem. The greatest threat to information security could be 
employees who are not information security conscious (Öğütçü, Testik, & 
Chouseinoglou, 2015; Shropshire et al., 2015).  
Information security behaviour refers to the behaviour of employees when they 
engage with information systems, including hardware, software and network 
systems. Such security-related behaviours have major implications for information 
security  (Guo, 2013b). Depending on its nature, employee behaviour may either 
pose a risk or reduce threats to information security. Information security 
behaviour is classified into four broad categories, according to Guo (2013b). 
These categories include security assurance behaviour, security compliant 
behaviour, security risk-taking behaviour and security damaging behaviour (Guo, 
2013b). Each of these categories is discussed in the following subsections. 
5.6.1 Security Assurance Behaviour 
Security assurance behaviour (SAB) refers to intentional behaviours that 
employees carry out actively to protect information assets and information 
systems. In other words, this behaviour refers to employees that are information 
security conscious. This is the most desirable behaviour from an information 
security management perspective. Examples of security assurance behaviour 
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include identifying and being aware of threats and implementing the necessary 
security measures to counteract those threats. A significant characteristic of SAB 
is that it implies conscientious action, which means that employees make an effort 
to behave securely. This means that employees are going further than what is 
required or expected of them to do (Guo, 2013b). 
5.6.2 Security Compliant Behaviour 
Security compliant behaviour (SCB) refers to intentional or unintentional 
behaviours that adhere to organisational information security policies. According to 
Guo (2013), SCB behaviours may be intentional in that employees make a 
conscious effort to avoid infringing security policies. It may also be unintentional in 
that employees may do something without thinking about security issues in mind, 
although their behaviour might still be adhering to security policies. Employees in 
the SCB group can be viewed as doing what they are required to do (Guo, 2013b). 
Individuals are motivated by different characteristics to comply with information 
security policies. These characteristics may be inherently related to personality, 
habits and skills. Environmental factors, for example, information security culture, 
may also influence an individual  either to comply with or to violate security policies 
(Padayachee, 2012). 
5.6.3 Security Risk-taking Behaviour 
Security risk-taking behaviour (SRB) refers to intentional behaviours that may put 
information systems at risk, although not with the intentional motive to cause 
damage. In other words, employees may put organisations at risk unintentionally 
by, for example, writing down passwords, leaving sensitive documents lying 
around or visiting websites that are not secure. This behaviour can be likened to 
that of a non-malicious security violation (Guo, Yuan, Archer, & Connelly, 2011). 
Employees in this group are not doing what they are supposed to do (Guo, 
2013b). 
5.6.4 Security Damaging Behaviour 
Security damaging behaviour (SDB) refers to intentionally damaging behaviours 
that can cause significant damage to information systems. These behaviours are 
malicious and deliberate, and can be subject to punishment under the laws and 
regulations of the society rather than policies. Examples of SDB include industrial 
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espionage, fraud and information theft. Essentially, employees that are 
categorised in this group are intentionally doing what they are prohibited from 
doing. There are similarities between employees in the SRB and SDB groups in 
that they are both doing what they are prohibited from doing. However, the 
difference between the two groups is in the consequences of their behaviours. In 
the case of SDB, the consequence is direct damage to information systems, while 
in the case of SRB, the consequence is risk, which may not necessarily cause 
damage (Guo, 2013b). 
Based on the previous discussion regarding the different security-related 
behaviours, it is evident that security assurance behaviours are the ideal 
behaviours to ensure information security. Ultimately, within an organisation 
information security should be second nature to employees, which means it should 
not be a conscious effort, but a subconscious one and part of their everyday 
behaviour. 
When computing students graduate from higher education institutions, they are 
likely to be employed by organisations. As such, they will be expected to protect 
organisational information systems and related information assets. Therefore, they 
need to be educated on how to protect information assets and information 
systems. Ideally, this should be done before graduating from higher education 
institutions. Higher education institutions are responsible for producing computing 
graduates who are information security conscious and who meet industry needs 
with regard to information security (Talib et al., 2012).  
Computing students who have not been educated with regard to information 
security could typically fall into the security risk-taking behaviours category. This is 
mainly due to the fact that they may not be aware that their actions or inactions, 
pose a risk to information assets and information systems. The ideal situation 
would be one where computing students are in the security assurance behaviours 
category before graduating and becoming employees. The factors identified in 
Section 5.5 could possibly influence the information security behaviour of 
computing graduates to shift from security risk-taking behaviour to security 
assurance behaviour. While security assurance behaviour is seen as a conscious 
effort, over time, this behaviour could become internalized and could lead to an 
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information security culture where the second-nature behaviour of computing 
graduates in higher education institutions is security assurance behaviour. The 
following section discusses information security culture. 
5.7  Information Security Culture 
As discussed in Section 5.3, culture influences behaviour and behaviour could 
influence culture. This section specifically discusses the relationship between 
information security behaviour and information security culture. For information 
security to be effective, a positive information security culture should exist (Von 
Solms & Von Solms, 2004). Information security culture is defined as “the 
collection of perceptions, attitudes, values, assumptions, and knowledge that 
guide the human interaction with information assets in an organisation with the aim 
of influencing employees’ security behaviour to preserve information security” 
(Alhogail & Mirza, 2014).  
Figure 5.4 illustrates the relationship between organisational culture, information 
security culture and information security behaviour. Information security culture 
forms part of the overarching organisational culture. Organisational culture, 
therefore, influences information security culture (Thomson & Von Solms, 2005). 
 
Figure 5.4: Relationship between organisational culture, information security 
culture and information security behaviour (Mabece et al., 2016) 
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The presence of a positive information security culture could possibly influence the 
information security behaviour of computing graduates. Information security 
culture shapes and guides information security behaviour. Similarly, an information 
security culture is cultivated by information security behaviour (Alhogail & Mirza, 
2014; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Hu et al., 2012). If an information security culture 
does not exist within an organisation, the behaviour of new employees, for 
example computing graduates, coming into the organisation could influence the 
cultivation of an information security conscious culture (Mabece et al., 2016). 
Thus, information security culture is identified as one of the key factors that could 
influence the information security behaviour of computing graduates. 
5.8  Conclusion 
Humans often represent vulnerabilities to organisational information assets and 
information systems owing to their ignorance or lack of knowledge on how to 
configure, operate and maintain technical and procedural security measures. 
Therefore, it is important that organisations focus on human behaviour with regard 
to information security. 
Explaining human behaviour is a difficult task owing to the complexity of human 
beings. It is, however, important to understand what influences behaviour, as well 
as how to change behaviour. In order to have a better understanding of factors 
that influence behaviour, some behavioural theories were identified and discussed. 
These theories include the Theory of Planned Behaviour, Protection Motivation 
Theory and the Social Cognitive Theory. Understanding which factors motivate 
humans to adopt information security practices is fundamental to solving 
information security problems. A number of factors were identified and discussed 
in Section 5.5 as they were relevant to this research. These factors and how they 
relate to this research are discussed in Chapter 7, Section 7.2. 
Four security-related behaviours were identified and discussed. These include 
security assurance behaviour, security compliant behaviour, security risk-taking 
behaviour and security damaging behaviour. Security assurance behaviour was 
identified as the ideal security-related behaviour for computing students to 
demonstrate when they graduate and are employed in organisations. It is argued 
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that in order for computing students to demonstrate this behaviour, the identified 
factors that could influence the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates need to be addressed.  
The following chapter presents the results and findings from the data collected 
from the semi-structured interviews carried out with computing educators at 
various South African higher education institutions. 
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 6: Survey Results and Findings 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present the results from the survey, which was in the 
form of semi-structured interviews supported by a questionnaire. The purpose of 
the survey, as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4, was to address three survey 
objectives, referred to as survey objective 1, survey objective 2 and survey 
objective 3. These survey objectives include, “To determine computing educators’ 
perspectives regarding the extent to which information security is currently 
integrated within computing curricula and their perceptions regarding the pervasive 
integration of information security (SvO1)”, “To determine the current information 
security behaviour of computing students and educators as perceived by 
computing educators (SvO2)”, and “To determine the importance of various 
information security behaviours as perceived by computing educators (SvO3)” 
respectively. Twenty participants participated in the study; however, only nineteen 
participants responded to survey objective 3. These participants were computing 
educators from six South African higher education institutions. 
The results of the survey are important as they provide insight into the extent to 
which information security is currently integrated in computing curricula and the 
perceptions of computing educators regarding the pervasive integration of 
information security. Additionally, they provide the perceptions of computing 
educators on the information security behaviour of their students and colleagues, 
as well as the importance of various information security behaviours. It is important 
to note that although the ACM curricular guidelines state that information 
assurance and security should be an integrative knowledge area, the results show 
that this is not the case in the higher education institutions that participated in the 
study. 
The rest of this chapter is outlined as follows: Section 6.2 addresses the results 
and findings from the study, while Section 6.3 presents the significant findings 
from the study. Section 6.4 concludes this chapter. 
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6.2 Results and Findings 
The purpose of this section is to provide the results of the survey described in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.4. The following sections discuss the results according to the 
three survey objectives. 
6.2.1 Survey Objective 1 
The aim of survey objective 1 is to determine computing educators’ perspectives 
regarding the extent to which information security is currently integrated within 
computing curricula and their perceptions regarding the pervasive integration of 
information security. 
Table 6.1 represents the number of participants who answered “yes” or “no” to the 
closed questions for survey objective 1. It is important to note that the table does 
not show the complete list of questions for this section, as some were open-ended 
questions.  However, answers to both the closed and open-ended questions will 
be discussed in this subsection. 
No. Closed Questions  Yes No 
1.1 Do you teach any security-related 
modules? 
9  
(45%) 
11 
(55%) 
1.3 Is information security pervasively 
integrated within other modules? 
14 
(70%) 
6 
(30%) 
1.5 Do you think information security should 
be an important part of your discipline? 
19 
(95%) 
1 
(5%) 
1.8 Do you think that your colleagues share 
the same views with regard to 
pervasively integrating information 
security? 
19 
(95%) 
1 
(5%) 
1.10 Do you foresee any perceived challenges 
with regard to pervasively integrating 
information security? 
18 
(90%) 
2 
(10%) 
Table 6.1: Survey objective 1 closed questions and responses 
As shown in Table 6.1, 11 (55%) of the participants indicated that they did not 
teach any specific security-related modules (Question 1.1). In response to 
Question 1.2 in Table 2.2, the 9 (45%) participants who answered “yes” to 
Question 1.1 indicated they taught security-related modules ranging from 1st year 
through to 5th year of study. For Question 1.3, it must be noted that even though 
the question asked if information security was pervasively integrated, participants 
interpreted the question differently.  14 (70%) of the participants indicated that 
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although there are certain modules that integrate only a few information security 
components, there was little indication of pervasive integration (Question 1.3). 
Participants who indicated “yes” answered by giving examples of modules that had 
an information security chapter or section. Examples of these modules that had 
limited integration included project management, e-business and databases (Table 
2.2, Question 1.4). 19 (95%) of the participants agreed that information security 
should be an important part of their discipline, with the exception of one of the 
participants who did not think information security was particularly important 
(Question 1.5).  
In response to Question 1.6 in Table 2.2, one participant indicated that people 
interact with information and information systems on a daily basis; thus they 
should be able to protect those information systems. Other participants indicated 
that it is important not just for school, but for everyday life as information security is 
a real world problem. The general view with regard to participant views on the 
pervasive integration of information security is that it is important to integrate 
information security. However, it should be contextualised within the applicable 
modules (Table 2.2, Question 1.7).  
19 (95%) participants indicated that they thought their colleagues shared the same 
views as they did with regard to pervasively integrating information security 
(Question 1.8). It was indicated that colleagues with some information security 
background knowledge shared the same views with regard to the integration of 
information security (Table 2.2, Question 1.9). 
18 (90%) of the participants indicated that they foresaw challenges with 
pervasively integrating information security into their modules (Table 6.2, Question 
1.10). In answer to the open-ended Question 1.11 in Table 2.2, as to what 
perceived challenges they foresaw, the participants mentioned: 
 Not enough time within their classes for their existing modules to include 
information security,  
 Information security is too technical,  
 Educators not knowing how to integrate information security within their 
respective modules. 
The next section discusses survey objective 2 results. 
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6.2.2 Survey Objective 2 
The aim of survey objective 2 is to determine the current information security 
behaviour of computing students and educators as perceived by computing 
educators. 
Table 6.2 represents the number of participants who answered “yes”’ or “no” for 
each closed question. As previously mentioned, the table does not show the 
complete list of questions for this section, as some were open-ended questions.  
However, answers to both the closed and open-ended questions will be discussed 
in this subsection. 
No. Closed Questions  Yes No 
2.1 Do you think that your students behave in a 
secure manner? 
6 
(30%) 
14 
(70%) 
2.3 Are you aware of any information security 
behavioural policies within your institution? 
0 
(0%) 
20 
(100%) 
2.4 Are students aware of any ICT related usage 
policies? 
9 
(45%) 
11 
(55%) 
2.5 Are there any consequences for “incorrect” 
ICT usage policy behaviour? 
17 
(85%) 
3 
(15%) 
2.7 In your opinion, does an information security 
culture exist in your department amongst 
your colleagues? 
14 
(70%) 
6 
(30%) 
Table 6.2: Survey objective 2 closed questions and responses 
As can be seen in Table 6.2, 14 (70%) of the participants indicated that their 
students do not behave securely (Question 2.1). In relation to Table 2.3, Question 
2.2, examples provided by the participants indicated that their students did not 
behave in a secure manner as they tend to share passwords/accounts. They also 
do not log off their computers and they do not scan their USB sticks. 
All of the participants (100%) indicated that they were not aware of any information 
security behavioural policies that exist at their respective institutions. Upon further 
investigation, participants mentioned that their higher education institutions had 
ICT usage policies that students had to comply with (Question 2.3). 9 (45%) of the 
participants’ perceptions indicated that their students were aware of the ICT usage 
policies (Question 2.4). 
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17 (85%) of the participants indicated that there were consequences for incorrect 
ICT usage policy behaviour (Question 2.5). Consequences provided by 
participants for “incorrect” ICT usage behaviour (Table 2.2, Question 2.6) included: 
 Disciplinary hearings,  
 Community service,  
 Banning students from laboratories.  
14 (70%) of the participants specified that an information security culture does 
exist within their department amongst colleagues (Question 2.7).  Locked office 
doors, passwords protecting examination papers when sent via email and logging 
off unattended computers were some examples highlighted as evidence of a 
security culture (Table 2.2, Question 2.8). 
Some examples highlighted by participants with regard to how they would 
influence students and colleagues to behave more securely included (Table 2.3, 
Question 2.9): 
 Knowledge/education/awareness,  
 Contextualised examples,  
 Scenarios,  
 Scare tactics, 
 Case studies. 
The next section presents survey objective 3 results. 
6.2.3 Survey Objective 3 
The aim of survey objective 3 is to determine the importance of various information 
security behaviours as perceived by computing educators. 
This section was answered by nineteen of the twenty participants (n=19).  Table 
6.3 represents the number of participants for each Likert scale rating, where 1 
indicates “not important” and 5 indicates “very important”. The list of behaviours 
provided to participants was adapted from Whitman & Mattord (2012). 
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Table 6.3: Survey objective 3 checklist 
No. 
 
Information 
Security 
Behaviours  
1 2 3 4 5 Total Average 
3.1 Not using a 
computer to harm 
other people, e.g. 
cyber bullying 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(3) 
6 
(24) 
12 
(60) 
87 4.58 
3.2 Not using computers 
to steal, e.g. stealing 
information, software 
piracy etc. 
1 
(1) 
0 
(0) 
6 
(18) 
2 
(8) 
9 
(45) 
86 4.53 
3.3 Not using other 
people's computer 
resources without 
authorisation or 
proper 
compensation. 
0 
(0) 
1 
(2) 
4 
(12) 
5 
(20) 
9 
(45) 
81 4.26 
3.4 Not appropriating 
other people's 
intellectual output, 
e.g. plagiarism. 
0 
(0) 
1 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
6 
(24) 
12 
(60) 
80 4.21 
3.5 Not snooping around 
in other people’s 
computer files. 
0 
(0) 
2 
(4) 
2 
(6) 
7 
(28) 
8 
(40) 
79 4.16 
3.6 Not using computers 
to bear false 
witness, e.g. 
fraudulent activity. 
1 
(1) 
4 
(8) 
4 
(12) 
3 
(12) 
7 
(35) 
78 4.11 
3.7 Not interfering with 
other people's 
computer work. 
1 
(1) 
2 
(4) 
3 
(9) 
2 
(8) 
11 
(55) 
72 3.79 
3.8 Using a computer in 
a way that ensures 
consideration and 
respect for your 
fellow humans. 
0 
(0) 
2 
(4) 
3 
(9) 
3 
(12) 
11 
(55) 
72 3.79 
3.9 Not copying or using 
proprietary software 
for which you have 
not paid. 
1 
(1) 
1 
(2) 
5 
(15) 
3 
(12) 
7 
(35) 
68 3.58 
3.10 Thinking about the 
social consequences 
of the programme 
you are writing or 
the system you are 
designing. 
1 
(1) 
1 
(2) 
2 
(6) 
6 
(24) 
7 
(35) 
68 3.58 
 68 | P a g e  
 
Table 6.3 can be read as follows: for each question the numbers above the 
parentheses indicate the number of people who rated the particular behaviour on a 
scale from 1 to 5.  For example, behaviour 3.1, 12 of the 19 participants gave the 
behaviour a rating of 5; 6 participants rated the behaviour 4; while 3 participants 
rated this behaviour 3. Zero participants rated this behaviour 2 or 1. A subtotal 
score for each question was worked out by multiplying the number of participants 
by the rating (represented in the parenthesis).  For example, behaviour 3.1, 12 
participants rated 5 for the behaviour, resulting in a subtotal score of 60 (5x12).  
The Total score was calculated by summing the subtotal for each Likert rating. 
From this total score, the average score was derived by dividing the Total score by 
the number of participants (Average = Total/n). From this average score, the order 
of importance of these information security behaviours was determined. 
“Not using a computer to harm other people, e.g. cyber bullying” was first on the 
list of highest importance according to participant ratings with an average rating of 
4.58. This means that on average, all 19 participants who responded rated 
behaviour 3.1 as a 4.58. Least important on the list are “Not copying or using 
proprietary software for which you have not paid” and “Thinking about the social 
consequences of the programme you are writing or the system you are designing”. 
These behaviours received an average score rating of 3.58. These behaviours 
were deemed less important than the other behaviours by participants. 
Question 3.11 asked participants to add any other behaviours they thought should 
be included in the list. Awareness of computer security, social networking 
awareness, personal information protection, mobile device security and email 
security were mentioned. 
6.3 Significant Findings 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.4, the ACM computing curricular guidelines 
(ACM, 2013; Lunt et al., 2008; Topi et al., 2010) clearly present information 
assurance and security (IAS) as an integrative knowledge area that should 
permeate other knowledge areas. However, results from the survey show that 
information security is not pervasively integrated within computing curricula. 
Participants indicated that possible challenges for pervasive integration could be 
that educators did not know how to integrate security; they did do not have enough 
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time within their modules; and that information security is too complex. More focus 
should be placed on ways to incorporate information security practically within 
these modules so that it permeates throughout each computing discipline. 
Participants generally acknowledged the importance of information security as 
being an integral part of any ICT practitioner’s daily life. The participants from the 
information systems discipline in particular emphasised that information was at the 
core of what they did within their discipline. Those participants were eager to 
integrate information security within their modules as long as it did not dominate a 
particular module. 
The majority of the participants (95%) were advocating for the integration of 
information security within modules. The participants indicated that they want 
small, contextualised components that are applicable to each of their specific 
modules. One of the participants used the analogy of information security being 
like a pizza, where the pizza could be sliced into smaller pieces, but when put 
together creates the whole.  Similarly, information security can be broken up into 
smaller components that could be incorporated and integrated within various 
modules within computing curricula, but when knowledge from all these 
components are combined, it provides a “whole” picture of information security. 
Another participant likened information security to icing on a cake. He indicated 
that a cake is incomplete without the icing on top. Similarly, the knowledge of 
computing graduates through their computing qualifications could be seen as 
incomplete without information security knowledge and insight.  
Ideally, information security should be integrated in such a way that different 
concepts are covered in different modules. There should be limited overlapping of 
the same concepts as that could prove to be redundant. Participants indicated that 
they were not equipped with any guidelines on how to integrate information 
security concepts into their modules. This poses a great challenge because the 
ACM says that information security should be a pervasive theme, but they do not 
provide ways to do this.  
The majority of participants (70%) indicated that their students did not act in a 
secure manner. This result indicates that there is a significant need for change in 
information security behaviour. Perceived behavioural control and self-efficacy are 
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some factors that could possibly address this. If these students are equipped with 
the necessary knowledge, skills and insight, this could influence their perceived 
behavioural control or self-efficacy. The higher the perceived behavioural control 
or self-efficacy, the more likely the students would be to act in a secure manner. 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1, also highlights intention as a factor that that could 
influence the behaviour of computing graduates. The higher the intention to 
comply with the required behaviour, the more likely computing students will be to 
change their information security behaviour, and vice versa.  Information security 
education could play an important role in equipping the students with the 
necessary knowledge, skills and insight as highlighted in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.5, policies were identified as being one of the 
factors that could influence behaviour. However, results from the survey showed 
that all of the participants (100%) indicated that they were not aware of the 
existence of an information security behavioural policy within their institutions. 
They were, however, aware of ICT usage policies that the students had to agree to 
and adhere to. It was noted that in some of these institutions these policies were 
not monitored or followed up. In essence, there would be no consequences if 
students did not adhere to these policies. In those institutions that did have 
consequences, the most common consequences were disciplinary hearings and 
community service. One participant indicated that educators in his department had 
drawn up a code of conduct that students had to obey. Educators themselves 
could ban students from the labs if they did not comply with the code of conduct.  
An information security culture could be one of the factors that could influence the 
information security behaviour of computing graduates. Most of the participants 
provided examples of a security culture within their work environment. This 
included locking office doors, encrypting exam papers, using secure printers to 
print important documents and logging off computers.   However, examples were 
also provided where students shared accounts and related passwords, did not log 
off computers and did not scan their USB sticks.  These are examples of insecure 
behaviour, indicating a limited information security culture in some institutions. 
When asked how they would influence someone to behave more securely, 
participant responses ranged from education, awareness and training, scare 
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tactics, and contextualised examples to illustrating real world problems and 
consequences. The prevailing response amongst the participants was education 
as a means to influence the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates.  
No. Summary of Significant Findings 
Finding 
6.3.1 
Computing students often do not act in a secure 
manner with regard to information security. 
Finding 
6.3.2 
A limited information security culture exists within 
computing departments surveyed. 
Finding 
6.3.3 
There is limited pervasive integration of information 
security within computing curricula 
Finding 
6.3.4 
Computing educators surveyed were not aware of 
information security behavioural policies 
Table 6.4: Summary of significant findings 
Table 6.4 depicts a summary of the significant findings from the survey. These 
findings support the problem statement stated in Chapter 1, Section 1.4, which 
highlights that higher education institutions are currently not doing enough to 
positively influence the information security behaviour of their computing 
graduates.  
6.4 Conclusion 
In order to protect the information assets of an organisation adequately, computing 
graduates must behave in a secure manner. In order for them to act more 
securely, there needs to be a change in behaviour. The results from the survey 
suggest that participants generally accepted that information security is an 
important part of everyday life and thus should be taught in computing curricula. It 
is evident from these participant responses, however, that there is little pervasive 
integration of information security within these higher education institutions. It is 
believed that if computing graduates were exposed to information security 
education, this could influence the information security behaviour of these students 
positively. However, as was highlighted in Chapter 5, Section 5.5, education is one 
of a number of factors that could possibly influence the information security 
behaviour of computing graduates. If educators and higher education institutions 
do not see the need for the pervasive integration of information security education, 
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it would be very difficult for the students to acquire this information security 
knowledge. In the same way that uneducated users are the weakest link with 
regard to information security, educated users could be the strongest link with 
regard to the protection of information.  
The following chapter presents the model to address factors that could influence 
the information security behaviour of computing graduates. 
 
 73 | P a g e  
 
 7: Proposed Model 
7.1 Introduction 
As highlighted in previous chapters, human behaviour presents one of the biggest 
security risks when it comes to the protection of information assets. Organisations 
often turn to technological solutions to try to curb this security risk, but 
technological solutions alone are not effective in protecting information assets. It 
is, therefore, important that organisations focus on the behaviour of humans in 
their information security efforts. However, human behaviour is a complex issue 
that is difficult to explain, as there are many personal and environmental factors 
that influence it. Understanding which factors motivate humans to adopt different 
behaviours is fundamental to addressing human issues relating to information 
security. 
The primary objective of this research was to develop a model to address factors 
that could influence the information security behaviour of computing graduates. 
The ideal information security behaviour for computing graduates, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.6, would be security assurance behaviour. In order for 
computing graduates to display this desired behaviour, it is important that incorrect 
behaviour such as security risk-taking behaviour is identified and modified. This 
research argues that various factors need to be addressed in order to influence 
the information security behaviour of computing graduates. These factors were 
identified through a literature study and discussed in the previous chapters (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.5, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, Section 5.5).  
This chapter provides an overview of the identified factors in Section 7.2. Section 
7.3 discusses the development of the proposed model followed by the proposed 
model in Section 7.4. Finally, the chapter concludes in Section 7.5. 
7.2 Factors Influencing Information Security Behaviour 
As stated in Section 7.1, it is important to understand the various factors that could 
influence the information security behaviour of computing graduates in order to 
change their behaviour. The factors identified in Chapter 5, Section 5.5, are 
summarised in Table 7.1. These factors can be grouped either into personal or 
environmental factors, as depicted in Table 7.1. For each factor identified, the 
related theory and chapter/section in which it is addressed is shown.  
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Influence Factor Chapter/Section Theory 
P
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
Attitude 
 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1 Theory of Planned 
Behaviour 
Perceived 
behavioural 
control and 
Self-efficacy 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1,  
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2,  
Theory of Planned 
Behaviour 
Protection Motivation 
Theory 
Perceived 
vulnerability 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2 Protection Motivation 
Theory 
Perceived 
severity 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2 Protection Motivation 
Theory 
Outcome 
expectancy 
Chapter 5, Section 5.5 Social Cognitive Theory 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l 
Subjective 
norms, 
Modelling, 
Identification 
and 
Culture 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3 
and Chapter 5, Section 
5.7 
Theory of Planned 
Behaviour 
Social Cognitive Theory 
Social Cognitive Theory 
No theory 
Policies Chapter 3, Section 3.5.  
Chapter 5, Section 5.5 
No theory 
Education Chapter 4 
Chapter 5, Section 5.5 
No theory 
Table 7.1: Factors influencing information security behaviour 
Although these factors come from different theories, they have similar meanings. 
As seen in Table 7.1, culture, policies and education do not come from specific 
theories. Each of the identified factors and their relation to this research are 
discussed below. 
Attitude  
As seen in Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1, attitude is identified as a personal factor that 
affects the intention to change behaviour. A person’s attitude is important as it 
influences whether they perform a certain behaviour or not (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & 
Sheikh, 2013; Khang, Han, & Ki, 2014). In relation to this research, computing 
graduates with a positive attitude towards information security are more likely to 
adhere to the required security assurance behaviour, while computing graduates 
with a negative attitude are less likely to adhere to the required security assurance 
behaviour.  
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Perceived Behavioural Control and Self-Efficacy  
Perceived behavioural control and self-efficacy refer to one’s belief in their 
capability to execute a particular behaviour that is required to manage a specific 
situation (Ajzen, 1991; Baker & White, 2010; Maddux & Rogers, 1983). The higher 
the perceived behavioural control and self-efficacy, the more likely an individual 
will be to perform the behaviour. Conversely, the lower the perceived behavioural 
control and  self-efficacy, the less likely an individual will be to perform the 
behaviour (Safa et al., 2015; Vance et al., 2012). Computing graduates with a high 
perceived behavioural control and self-efficacy are more likely to execute the 
required behaviour as opposed to computing graduates with a low perceived 
capability. When it comes to information security and the protection of information 
assets, it is important for computing graduates to have high perceived behavioural 
control and self-efficacy so that they could demonstrate the desired security 
assurance behaviour. 
Perceived Vulnerability  
Perceived vulnerability refers to the perceived susceptibility of an individual to a 
threat. If  individuals do not perceive themselves to be vulnerable to a threat, they 
are less likely to implement protective behaviour (Posey et al., 2014; Vance et al., 
2012). Computing graduates often have to be educated about the various threats 
that they are susceptible to in order for them to protect themselves from those 
threats (Vance et al., 2012). If computing students do not know that they are 
susceptible to information security threats, they are less likely to behave in a 
secure manner with regard to information assets and information systems.  
Perceived Severity  
Perceived severity refers to the perceived impact that a threat poses (Posey et al., 
2014). If individuals do not perceive the impact of a threat to be severe, they are 
less likely to implement protective behaviour (Vance et al., 2012). Computing 
students should be aware of the potential impact that information security threats 
can have on information assets and information systems.  
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Outcome Expectancy 
Outcome expectancy refers to the anticipated outcome when a person executes a 
particular behaviour or the likelihood of certain behaviour leading to a specific 
outcome (Bandura, 1971; Leeuw, Valois, Ajzen, & Schmidt, 2015; Tobergte & 
Curtis, 2013). For example, the expected consequences for exceeding the speed 
limit could be a fine or jail time. Relating outcome expectancy to this research, if 
computing students do not adhere to an ICT usage policy in laboratories, they 
could be denied access. Therefore, the outcome expectancy of the computing 
students would be that if they do not adhere to the ICT usage policy, they would 
be denied laboratory and internet access. This negative consequence could 
influence computing students to demonstrate the desired information security 
behaviour. 
Subjective Norms, Modelling, Identification and Culture  
Subjective norms refer to the perceptions and expectations that individuals have 
about their social environment, for example social groups (Ajzen, 1991). Similarly, 
modelling provides an individual with an identifiable model that might have already 
accomplished the desired behaviour (Bandura, 1971). Likewise, identification 
refers to the one-to-one similarity that the individual feels with the model (Bandura, 
1988; Terry & Hogg, 1996). According to Schein (1999) culture refers to the 
shared basic assumptions learned by a group to solve its problems, which have 
worked well enough to be considered valid. Essentially, the common thread 
between these factors refers to an individual’s social environment or social 
pressures (Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1971; Schein, 1999). If there is no social 
pressure to change behaviour, behaviour change is less likely to occur. As 
previously highlighted in Chapter 5, Section 5.3, culture shapes and guides the 
behaviour of people. Results from the survey, as discussed in Chapter 6, Section 
6.2, revealed that most of the computing departments that participated in the study 
have a limited security culture. In the context of this research, it is important that 
higher education institutions have a positive information security culture, as this 
could possibly influence the information security behaviour of computing students. 
Furthermore, it is important that higher education institutions provide computing 
students with an environment where security assurance behaviour is the norm. It 
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could be argued that if computing students have role models they can identify with, 
for example their educators, they too could be influenced to display the desired 
security assurance behaviour. 
Policies  
Top management needs to convey an information security vision for the 
organisation through policies. Information security policies are important within 
organisations as they dictate the appropriate behaviour of employees (Höne & 
Eloff, 2002; Sohrabi Safa et al., 2016; Von Solms & Von Solms, 2004). It can, 
therefore, be argued that policies should have a direct influence on behaviour. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.5, policies form part of the procedural security 
measures that are employed to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of information assets (McCumber, 2005). Information security policies are 
important as they define how people should behave with regard to protecting 
information assets within organisations. Similarly, an information security policy 
within higher education institutions should provide guidance to computing students 
on how to behave with regard to information security. However, results from the 
survey, as discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2, revealed that all of the computing 
educators surveyed were not aware of information security behavioural policies 
within their institutions.  
Education  
Often computing students need to be educated to protect themselves from 
physical or environmental information security threats. Education is important as it 
not only teaches what to do and how to do it, but also why it is important to do so 
(Cox, 2012; Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2005). For example, a person might click 
on an unknown link in a phishing email that might cause risk for an organisation. 
People need to be educated on the risks and the necessary safeguards needed to 
protect organisational information assets. One of the survey objectives in Chapter 
6 was to determine the extent to which information security is currently integrated 
within undergraduate computing curricula. Results showed that there was very 
limited information security integration within the participating higher education 
institutions. If information security education is a factor that could influence the 
information security behaviour of computing graduates, it is important that there is 
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a lot more integration within higher education institutions. For the purpose of this 
research, information security education is important as it could provide computing 
graduates with the necessary knowledge, insight and skills they need to protect 
information assets within organisations.  
The aforementioned factors provide a foundation for the development of a model 
to address factors that could positively influence the information security behaviour 
of computing graduates. The following section describes the development of the 
model.  
7.3  Development of Proposed Model 
The purpose of the proposed model is to address the factors that could influence 
the information security behaviour of computing graduates.  A phased approach 
has been taken to explain how the model was built using a theoretical foundation. 
The first phase is adapted from the Social Cognitive Theory as discussed in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3. From Figure 7.1 it is evident that actual behavioural 
control is influenced by both personal factors and environmental factors. 
 
 
 79 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Personal, behavioural and environmental factors (adapted from Wood 
& Bandura, 1989) 
Examples of actual behavioural control include security assurance behaviour, 
security compliant behaviour, security risk-taking behaviour and security damaging 
behaviour (as can be seen in Chapter 5, Section 5.6). Based on the discussion of 
each of the security-related behaviours, security assurance behaviour is the ideal 
information security behaviour that computing graduates should demonstrate. 
However, in Table 6.4 in Chapter 6, Finding 6.3.1 indicates that computing 
students often do not act in a secure manner with regard to information security. 
This means that their actual behaviour control could either be security risk-taking 
behaviour or security damaging behaviour, both of which are undesirable 
information security behaviours.  Personal factors include attitude, self-efficacy, 
perceived vulnerability, perceived severity and outcome expectancy. These could 
influence computing graduates to modify their behaviour internally to the required 
information security behaviour. Environmental factors include culture, information 
security education and information security policies. These could influence 
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computing graduates externally to modify their behaviour to the required 
information security behaviour. 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3, the relationship between personal 
factors and behavioural factors reflects the bi-directional interaction between 
thoughts and actions. The personal factors represented in Figure 7.1 could 
influence the information security behaviour of computing graduates. Similarly, the 
information security behaviour of the computing graduates could influence how 
they think and feel about security assurance behaviour.  
The relationship between behavioural factors and environmental factors reflects 
the bi-directional interaction between behaviour and the social environment. An 
information security culture shapes and guides the information security behaviour 
of computing graduates. The dotted line represents socialisation, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.5. Socialisation is the mode where tacit knowledge is 
converted into tacit knowledge via the interaction of individuals. Through the 
socialisation of computing students and educators an information security culture 
could be cultivated. However, as seen in Table 6.4 in Chapter 6, Finding 6.3.2 
shows that the computing departments that participated in the study have a limited 
security culture. 
If the information security culture in higher education institutions reinforces security 
assurance behaviour, this could influence positively how the computing students 
think and feel about that behaviour. Likewise, the personal factors of computing 
students could influence environmental factors. This represents the bi-directional 
relationship between environmental factors and personal factors. It is important to 
note that the desired information security behaviour would be security assurance 
behaviour. However, the actual behavioural control shown in Figure 7.1 could 
result in any of the other undesirable information security behaviours, such as 
security risk-taking behaviour or security damaging behaviour.   
Figure 7.2 depicts the second phase of building the proposed model. It shows the 
personal and environmental factors of computing graduates that could influence 
their intention to comply with the required information security behaviour. 
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Figure 7.2: Personal, behavioural and environmental factors with intention 
(adapted from Ajzen, 1991; Wood & Bandura, 1989) 
It is important to note that this phase of the model builds on the Social Cognitive 
Theory from the first phase by introducing intention, which comes from the Theory 
of Planned Behaviour. 
 As highlighted in Section 5.4.1 of Chapter 5, intention does not always translate 
into the desired information security behaviour. However, if computing graduates 
have strong intentions and the self-efficacy to perform the desired behaviour, they 
are more likely to change their behaviour to the desired security assurance 
behaviour. Alternatively, if computing graduates do not have strong intentions and 
they do not have the self-efficacy to perform the desired behaviour, they are less 
likely to change to the required security assurance behaviour. 
Actual behavioural control represents the behavioural outcome influenced by the 
intention together with personal and environmental factors. This may not always 
reflect the desired behaviour. Ultimately, the personal factors, environmental 
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factors and intention should influence the actual behavioural control to be the 
desired security assurance behaviour.  
Figure 7.3 illustrates the third phase of the proposed model. Information security 
education and information security policies were also identified as environmental 
factors that could influence the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates. It could be argued that computing curricula guidelines are required to 
explain explicitly how information security should be integrated into computing 
curricula and should indicate the information security principles that should be 
taught to computing students.  
 
Figure 7.3: Information security education and policy factors (adapted from 
Mabece et al., 2016) 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.4, curricular guidelines, for example those 
provided by the ACM, are important as they provide guidance in terms of the 
curricula to various computing fields. Without these curricular guidelines, the 
externalisation process cannot occur. As can be seen in Chapter 4, Section 4.5, 
externalisation is the process of converting tacit knowledge into explicit 
knowledge. In Figure 7.3, the tacit knowledge of the authors of the ACM curricular 
guidelines is externalised into the explicit knowledge of the computing department 
within higher education institutions. The computing department would internalise 
this explicit knowledge into their tacit knowledge. It is important to highlight that 
computing educators form part of the computing department.  The computing 
department would also externalise their tacit knowledge into the information 
security principles that the computing students would need to learn.  
Combination occurs when explicit knowledge is transferred into explicit knowledge. 
This process happens when the students are taught in the classrooms or when 
they implement information security principles practically. This is where the 
pervasiveness of information security throughout computing curricula is 
imperative. The information security principles should not only be taught in one 
security-related module, but should be emphasised in multiple modules to 
emphasise their importance. However, results from the survey indicated that there 
is limited pervasive integration of information security within computing curricula 
within the computing departments surveyed. This process is represented by the 
link between information security principles and knowledge transfer to computing 
graduates. This part of the model represents information security education. 
The information security principles within the computing curricular should be 
reflected in the information security policies through the combination process. This 
highlights the link between information security principles and information security 
policies. As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.5, information security policies are 
necessary as they guide the information security behaviour of employees within 
organisations. Similarly, higher education institutions should have an information 
security policy that could guide the information security behaviour of computing 
students with regard to information security in the academic environment. 
However, as highlighted in Table 6.4, Finding 6.3.4, computing educators within 
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the departments surveyed were not aware of information security behavioural 
policies within their institutions. 
7.4 The Proposed Model 
This section will use the factors that were previously discussed to build the 
proposed model. Figure 7.4 illustrates the proposed model developed to address 
factors that could influence the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates. This figure represents the factors that could influence the behaviour of 
computing graduates.  
Curricular guidelines are the starting point of this model. Curricular guidelines 
would be externalised to computing educators in the computing department. The 
computing educators in the computing department would internalise the curricular 
guidelines and then externalise them into information security principles. Through 
the combination process, information security principles would be conveyed 
through knowledge transfer to computing students. Furthermore, the information 
security principles should be reflected in the information security policies through 
the combination process. 
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Figure 7.4: Proposed model 
Computing students would internalise the information security principles and this 
knowledge could influence their personal factors and their environmental factors. 
These personal and environmental factors could influence the intention of 
computing students to comply with the required information security behaviour. 
Personal factors, environmental factors and intention could influence the actual 
behavioural control which would ideally be security assurance behaviour. 
However, if information security education, information security policies, personal 
factors, environmental factors and intention are not positively aligned, the resulting 
information security behaviour might be security risk-taking behaviour or security 
damaging behaviour, which is undesirable. 
In order to contextualise the proposed model, an example will be used. Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2.3 identified “Not using a computer to harm other people, e.g. cyber 
bullying” as an important information security behaviour for computing students to 
display. Computing students would need to be educated with the necessary 
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knowledge needed for them to display this particular information security 
behaviour. There would also need to be an information security policy in place that 
externalises the vision of the computing department with regard to cyber bullying. 
Education and an enforced information security policy could act as a catalyst to 
influence the computing students to change their behaviour to the required 
security assurance behaviour of not cyber bullying. 
The topic of cyber bullying would be included in the curricular guidelines which 
would be externalised to the computing department. The computing department 
would internalise the curricular guidelines and externalise this topic into 
information security principles, for example ethical concepts of information 
security. The information security principles regarding cyber bullying would then be 
transferred into the explicit knowledge of the computing students when they are 
taught in their various lectures and practical classes.  
The computing students would then internalise this explicit knowledge into tacit 
knowledge through practical experience. Internalisation is the transfer of explicit 
knowledge to tacit knowledge. When computing students have learnt the 
information security principles (through combination), they would internalise that 
knowledge, which then influences their personal factors, such as their attitude and 
perceived behavioural control, which could, in turn, influence environmental 
factors, such as culture. In their modules, for example, computing students could 
be taught how to identify, report and prevent cyber bullying. With sufficient 
knowledge regarding cyber bullying, anti-cyber bullying could become second 
nature to these computing students. This knowledge could influence the personal 
and environmental factors of the computing students. However, the environmental 
factors, which relate to culture, would require that information security policies and 
other measures are in place to ensure adherence to information security principles 
regarding cyber bullying.  
The information security policy should externalise the vision of the computing 
department with regard to information security within higher education institutions. 
This information security policy could ultimately influence the information security 
culture of the computing students. Through the socialisation of computing 
students, the process of tacit knowledge being transferred into tacit knowledge 
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would occur. Computing students would observe and mimic how their peers 
behave with regard to cyber bullying. Adherence to the information security policy 
should ultimately lead to an information security culture where security assurance 
behaviour is the norm. It is important to note that without the catalysts of 
information security education and information security policies, the behaviour 
change process would not be able to start. Ultimately, information security 
education, information security policies, personal factors, and environmental 
factors as well as intention need to work together positively in order for the security 
assurance behaviour goal to be reached.  
7.5 Conclusion 
It is has been established throughout this research that humans represent the 
weakest link in the information security chain. Humans pose a significant threat 
whether intentionally or unintentionally to cause harm. Similarly, computing 
graduates could pose a significant threat to information security. This chapter 
introduced a proposed model to address this human factor. It is envisaged that this 
proposed model will contribute in the quest to positively influence the information 
security behaviour of computing graduates. 
The primary objective of this research was to develop a model to address factors 
that could positively influence the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates. With the development of this model, this primary objective is achieved. 
The ultimate goal of the model is to assist computing educators to influence the 
information security behaviour of computing graduates to the desired security 
assurance behaviour. If there are no curricular guidelines or if information security 
principles are not identified, information security knowledge transfer to computing 
graduates cannot occur. Similarly, if there are no information security policies in 
place to guide the information security behaviour of computing students, their 
behaviour is less likely to change to the required information security behaviour. If 
information security education and information security policies are not in place, 
the process of influencing the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates cannot start. This chapter discussed both personal and environmental 
factors that influence behaviour and argued that they could yield the desired 
security assurance behaviour outcome.  
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The following chapter concludes this research by arguing the meeting of the 
research objectives, as identified in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, highlighting the 
limitations of this research and suggesting future research.  
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 8: Conclusion 
 
“Now a whole is that which has a beginning, middle and end” – Aristotle (Hofstee, 
2006). 
8.1 Introduction 
Information has been identified as an important business asset that needs to be 
protected; hence the need for information security. Relying on technological and 
procedural security measures alone is not enough to protect information assets. 
These security measures rely heavily on humans to configure, operate and 
maintain them. However, the behaviour of humans with regard to the protection of 
information assets remains a significant problem. The behaviour of computing 
graduates is of particular importance to this research as they play an important 
role in protecting the information assets in organisations. 
 
The problem identified by this research is that currently many higher education 
institutions are not consciously doing enough to influence the information security 
behaviour of their computing graduates positively. In order to address this 
problem, it was necessary to develop a model to address factors, with a specific 
focus on factors that could influence the information security behaviour of 
computing graduates. 
This concluding chapter includes a summary of the previous chapters in Section 
8.2. It also describes how the research objectives outlined in Chapter 1 have been 
met in Section 8.3. Research limitations and suggestions for future research are 
discussed in Section 8.4, followed by closing remarks in Section 8.5. 
8.2 Summary of Chapters 
The aim of Chapter 1 was to introduce the field of study and to identify a problem 
within information security. It was established that the behaviour of humans is a 
hindrance to information security. The research objectives to address the problem 
were identified. Furthermore, this chapter discussed the most appropriate research 
methods to meet the research objectives.  
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Chapter 2 identifies and briefly discusses the research approach that was 
undertaken by this research in Section 2.2. Furthermore, this chapter describes 
the research techniques and procedures that were followed while conducting this 
research in Section 2.3. It also describes the systematic research process that 
was followed for the survey that was conducted in Section 2.4. This included the 
interview process, participants and the questionnaire design. 
Chapter 3 introduces information as an important business asset that needs to be 
protected in Section 3.2. If information is not protected, an organisation could be 
susceptible to potential threats. Humans were identified as a threat to information 
security in Section 3.3. The importance of information security was discussed 
using McCumber’s model. This model highlighted the multi-dimensional aspects of 
information security including the critical information characteristics, information 
states and security measures. These are discussed in Section 3.4. The 
importance of information security policies and how they influence behaviour was 
also highlighted in Section 3.5. A discussion on managing information security risk 
was highlighted in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 identifies and discusses various 
information security standards and best practices. The aim of these information 
security standards and best practices is to guide information security management 
in organisations. It was concluded that information security policies are one of the 
factors that could influence the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates. 
Information security education was discussed in Chapter 4. If humans are to 
operate technological and procedural security measures in an effort to protect 
information assets, they ought to know how to do so. This chapter, therefore, 
argues the need for information security education in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 
discusses the comparison between awareness, training and education as 
highlighted in various NIST documents. Section 4.4 describes the CS, IS and IT 
curricular guidelines relating to information security. The process of Nonaka’s 
modes of knowledge creation and their relation to this research is discussed in 
Section 4.5. It was concluded that information security education is one of the 
factors that could influence the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates. 
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The purpose of Chapter 5 was to understand behaviour. The human aspects of 
information security are addressed in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents a brief 
discussion of human behaviour in order to understand human behaviour in 
general. Behavioural theories that were relevant to this research are discussed in 
Section 5.4. Section 5.5 identifies and briefly discusses personal and 
environmental factors that could possibly influence behaviour. Some of these 
factors formed part of various behavioural theories. Information security 
behaviours are identified and discussed in Section 5.6. Information security culture 
and its relation to information security behaviour are highlighted in Section 5.7. It 
was concluded that attitude, perceived behavioural control, self-efficacy, perceived 
vulnerability, perceived severity, outcome expectancy, subjective norms, 
modelling, identification and information security culture are factors that could 
influence the information security behaviour of computing graduates. 
The aim of Chapter 6 was to present the results and findings from the survey 
conducted. Section 6.2 presents a discussion on the results and findings for each 
survey objective. Significant findings from the survey are highlighted and 
discussed in Section 6.3. The chapter highlights the existing gap with regard to 
information security not being pervasively integrated within computing curricula. 
The results from this survey also highlight that computing students are not 
behaving securely with regard to information security. Furthermore, it was 
identified that currently there are limited consequences for not behaving securely 
with regard to information security in higher education institutions. Another 
significant finding was that no specific information security policies exist within 
these higher education institutions. Furthermore, a positive information security 
culture does not exist within most higher education institutions. 
Chapter 7 establishes the solution to this research, which is a model to address 
factors that could influence the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates. This chapter firstly identifies and discusses the various personal and 
environmental factors that could influence the information security behaviour of 
computing graduates in Section 7.2. It is important to note that these factors were 
identified in various chapters throughout this research. Furthermore, specific 
factors were identified from various behavioural theories as discussed in Chapter 
5, Section 5.5. Subsequently, the different phases of how the proposed model was 
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developed are discussed in Section 7.3 and the proposed model is presented in 
Section 7.4. 
The chapters included in this dissertation helped to support the primary objective 
of this research. The following section describes how the primary objective was 
addressed. 
8.3 Meeting of Research Objectives 
The primary objective of this research was to develop a model to address the 
factors that could positively influence the information security behaviour of 
computing graduates. In order to achieve this primary objective, five secondary 
objectives were identified and defined. These secondary objectives are addressed 
in the discussion below. 
Secondary Objective 1: To determine the importance of information security in 
organisations. 
This objective was achieved by introducing the concept of information security 
within organisations. Additionally, this objective was met through an extensive 
literature review of existing research relating to information security, as discussed 
in Chapter 3. However, literature highlighted that the behaviour of humans remains 
a significant threat with regard to information security. The multi-dimensions of 
information security were highlighted by McCumber’s model in Chapter 3, Section 
3.4. In addition, various reputable information security standards and best 
practices were discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.7. Furthermore, Chapter 3, 
Section 3.5 discusses the importance of information security policies. 
Secondary Objective 2: To determine the importance of information security 
education in higher education institutions with a specific focus on computing 
curricula. 
This objective was achieved in Chapter 4 by highlighting the need for information 
security education. The ACM curricular guidelines discussed in Section 4.4 
emphasise that information security should be an integral part of the CS, IS and IT 
computing curricula. Several information security standards and best practices 
supported the need for information security education as highlighted in chapter 3, 
Section 3.7. Information security education was identified as one of the factors that 
could influence information security behaviour. 
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Secondary Objective 3: To understand information security behaviour and to 
identify key factors that could influence the information security behaviour of 
computing graduates 
This objective was met by identifying various factors that could influence the 
information security behaviour of computing graduates. In Chapter 3, Section 3.5, 
it was highlighted that an information security policy is one of the factors that could 
influence the information security behaviour of computing graduates. An 
information security policy is necessary as it shapes and guides the information 
security behaviour of employees within organisations. Similarly, an information 
security policy within higher education institutions could shape and guide the 
information security behaviour of computing graduates. 
Chapter 4, Section 4.2, highlighted the need for information security education and 
the role that it plays in influencing the information security behaviour of computing 
graduates. Information security education is necessary to teach computing 
students about information security principles. Information security education was 
highlighted as one of the factors that could influence the information security 
behaviour of computing graduates. 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4, presented behavioural theories that included the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour, the Protection Motivation Theory and the Social Cognitive 
Theory. From these theories, personal and environmental factors were identified. 
Personal factors include attitude, perceived behavioural control and self-efficacy, 
perceived vulnerability, perceived severity and outcome expectancy. 
Environmental factors include social norms, modelling, identification and culture. 
Culture, education and policies are not a part of any specific theories, but are 
argued to be key environmental factors. Therefore, the above-mentioned personal 
and environmental factors were identified as factors that could influence 
information security behaviour. 
Secondary Objective 4: To determine the extent to which information security is 
currently integrated within computing curricula in a South African context. 
This objective was achieved in Chapter 6. A survey was conducted in six higher 
education institutions in South Africa. The research design of the survey was 
discussed in Chapter 2. Results from the survey revealed that information security 
is not currently pervasively integrated within computing curricula. In addition, 
participants indicated that educators were not equipped to integrate information 
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security. Furthermore, they stated that they perceived information security to be 
too complex. The results from this survey further emphasise the need for 
information security education and support the identification of information security 
education as a key factor to influence information security behaviour. 
Secondary Objective 5: To determine the perceptions of computing educators 
regarding the information security behaviour of computing students in a South 
African context. 
As with secondary objective 4, this objective was achieved in Chapter 6. 
Educators’ perceptions from the survey conducted were that most computing 
students did not act in a secure manner with regard to information security. 
Additionally, results revealed that there were limited consequences for computing 
students behaving in a non-secure manner with regard to information security. 
Therefore, these results emphasise the need to influence the information security 
behaviour of computing graduates so that they could behave in a secure manner 
with regard to information security. 
By meeting these five secondary objectives, as identified in Chapter 1, the primary 
objective, “to develop a model to address "factors” that could positively influence 
the information security behaviour of computing graduates”, has been achieved. 
The model is presented in Chapter 7, in Section 7.4. The purpose of this model is 
to assist computing educators in influencing the information security behaviour of 
computing graduates so that they can have a positive impact on information 
security in the organisations in which they may be employed. 
8.4 Research Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The limitation of this study is that only six South African higher education 
institutions participated in the survey. Therefore, these results cannot be 
generalised.   
A further limitation is that this is a conceptual model with no implementation 
details. This model could be extended by providing detailed implementation 
guidelines to support the implementation of the model. Furthermore, these 
implementation guidelines would need to be validated in an academic context 
within a computing department. 
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8.5 Epilogue 
The process of completing this research has been both challenging and satisfying.  
It is hoped that this research will make a valuable contribution to the existing body 
of knowledge within information security education. In addition, it is hoped that the 
outcomes of this research will have a positive impact on future research. 
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Appendices 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A- Conference Paper 
Appendix A is a conference paper that was presented at the 
International Conference on Information Resources 
Management (Conf-IRM) held in Cape Town on 16 May 2016. 
Appendix B- Survey Questionnaire 
Appendix B1 
Appendix B1 is the list of questions from the questionnaire 
that was used to support the survey that was conducted as 
discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.  
Appendix B2 
Appendix B2 is the questionnaire checklist where participants 
indicated the importance of information security behaviours. 
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Abstract  
Information security has become increasingly important and is far more than a collection of 
physical and technical controls. It is widely cited in literature that humans are potentially the 
‘weakest link’ when it comes to information security, whether intentionally or unintentionally. 
For information security to be truly effective, the behaviour and actions of users, with regard to 
information security, should become part of their daily activities and, ultimately, part of an 
information security culture. Therefore, it could be argued that graduates entering the 
employment of an organisation should be aware and properly educated with regard to 
information security and its related practices. This information security awareness and education 
should, preferably, be a part of their formalized studies. This is particularly important for those 
graduates with computing qualifications as they could play a vital role in ensuring the protection 
of an organisation’s information assets.  This paper motivates the need for the implementation of 
pervasive information security education in computing undergraduate curricula, which could 
positively influence the information security behaviour of computing graduates. This research is 
based on a literature study. 
 
 
Keywords 
Information security awareness, information security education, information security culture, 
information security behaviour.  
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Towards using pervasive information security education to 
influence information security behaviour in undergraduate 
computing graduates 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Users often participate in risky behaviour that can threaten the confidentiality, integrity and the 
availability of information assets. User behaviour accounts for the majority of security breaches 
experienced by organisations, although often not with malicious intent to cause harm. Users who 
have not been educated with regard to information security could be easy targets for hackers 
because of their ignorance. Therefore, educated and trained people could be a critical success 
factor in order to mitigate threats within organisations (Al Awawdeh & Tubaishat, 2014; Cox, 
2012).  
Once graduates leave higher education institutions, it is very likely that they will become 
employees in organisations.  It is important that these graduates stay abreast of industry changes, 
as these graduates need to be able to solve real world problems. If the university curriculum does 
not offer the necessary tools needed to solve these real world problems, then the university has 
failed (Lunt et al., 2008).  With regard to computing graduates, it is vital that these graduates are 
aware of and are educated about the importance of information security and that they have the 
necessary skills and behaviour to protect information assets.  In the context of this research, 
computing graduates refer to Information Technology (IT), Information Systems (IS) and 
Computer Science (CS) graduates. 
The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) curricula guidelines (ACM, 2013) describe 
what characteristics computing graduates should have when they have completed their degrees. 
The IT guidelines specifically state that an IT graduate should have an “understanding of 
professional, ethical, legal, security and social issues and responsibilities”. The CS guidelines 
explain that a graduate “needs a set of general principles, such as sharing a common resource, 
security, and concurrency” (ACM, 2013). This, therefore, suggests that graduates from these 
disciplines should be information security conscious, particularly when they move into 
organisations. These computing graduates should contribute to the much needed information 
security conscious workforce, and could be the champions of information security initiatives 
within organisations. 
Higher education institutions are responsible for producing computing graduates who understand 
and execute information security initiatives. These graduates are also required to meet the needs 
of industry when employed by organisations (Talib, Khelifi, & Ugurlu, 2012). International 
standards and guidelines provide guidance for security requirements within organisations and to 
fulfil these requirements organisations need employees with the necessary knowledge and skills 
to help alleviate security breaches (Armstrong, 2011; Talib et al., 2012). It is important that 
computing graduates demonstrate the correct information security behaviour to be able to solve 
these real world security-related problems.  
This paper argues that a need exists for the implementation of pervasive information security 
education in undergraduate computing curricula in order to influence the graduates’ information 
security behaviour. Pervasive, in this context, is defined as “existing in all parts of a place or 
thing; spreading gradually to affect all parts of a place or thing” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015). 
Section 2 addresses information security within organisations, while Section 3 highlights the 
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current state of information security in undergraduate computing curricula. Section 4 considers 
information security behaviour, followed by a discussion on information security culture in 
Section 5. Section 6 explores the proposed solution to this research and finally the paper 
concludes with Section 7. 
 
2. Information security in organisations 
The importance of information being a vital business asset cannot be stressed enough. 
Information is critical to organisations. However, it is vulnerable to various threats and attacks 
from both insiders and outsiders. Insider threats may cause more damaging and costly incidents 
than outsider threats. Despite organisations taking various technical countermeasures to protect 
these assets, information security breaches are still increasing rapidly. This is possibly due to a 
lack of cooperation from users or a lack of knowledge on how to implement relevant controls.  
Organisations therefore need to focus their attention more on their users in order to mitigate 
potential threats, as it is often said that users are the greatest threat to information security 
(Tajuddin, Olphert, & Doherty, 2014; Tu & Yuan, 2014; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014).  
Further, organisations should have information security policies in place to communicate to users 
what the acceptable information security behaviour is. User compliance with regard to these 
policies is essential in ensuring that information assets remain protected. However, users often 
ignore, or do not comply with these policies for various reasons, for example, a lack of 
awareness and ignorance (Cox, 2012). 
Van Niekerk and von Solms (2005) argue that many security controls are liable to be misused or 
misinterpreted by users who do not have adequate security knowledge. Users have to be 
educated and trained to be information security conscious and motivated to comply with security 
policies and procedures. Education is important to not only teach users what to do and how to do 
it, but also why it should be done (van Niekerk & von Solms, 2005). According to Schein 
(1999), users will often refuse to accept the need for new, responsible behaviour patterns until 
they have been educated about a particular topic. An example of such topics would be threats to 
information assets and the need for information security. Education is often the only way to 
convince users of the need to do things differently (Schein, 1999). Therefore, users who are 
educated regarding information security best practices could be the strongest link within an 
organisation when it comes to the protection of information assets. This could assist in the 
mitigation of some of the threats (Al Awawdeh & Tubaishat, 2014; Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 
2015).  
Within the context of this paper, higher education institutions are organisations. Additionally, 
within the context of this paper, it is important to create the correct information security culture 
within higher education institutions. When computing graduates are employed in organisations, 
they too become users. Therefore, it could be argued that if computing graduates have been 
exposed to information security education during their studies, they could champion information 
security initiatives within these organisations. The following section explores information 
security in computing curricula. 
 
3. Information security in computing curricula 
Information security education should be offered at undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate 
levels at all academic institutions to cope with the prevailing information security problems 
plaguing organisations (Hentea, Dhillon, & Dhillon, 2006). Computing graduates entering the 
work environment should be able to exhibit and be skilled in the underlying principles of 
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information security (Futcher, Schroder, & von Solms, 2010). These graduates would, for 
example, typically be computer programmers, information security analysts, software 
developers, and database administrators. As such, they would interact with information assets 
and information systems. Information security education should, therefore, teach these students 
the fundamental principles they need in order to preserve and protect the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of an organisation’s information assets (Florentine, 2014; Pratt, 2014). 
According to the ACM, Information Assurance and Security (IAS) should be a very important 
part of computing curricula. IAS is defined as “a set of controls and processes, both technical 
and policy, intended to protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and by providing for authentication and non-
repudiation”. Assurance ensures that these processes and information are valid, while security 
ensures that these processes and information are protected (Committee on National Security 
Systems, 2010). 
The ACM guidelines for both IT and CS describe IAS as an integrative knowledge area that 
should be pervasive throughout other knowledge areas. However, the ACM IT guidelines state 
that IAS belongs at the advanced level of a four year IT program. Yet, some students do not get 
the chance to complete a fourth year of study. Therefore, it could be argued that these students 
may never encounter IAS education in other words information security education. The ACM IS 
guidelines refer to IAS as IT security and risk management; it also states that this is an elective 
course. More emphasis should be placed on this knowledge area to ensure that it permeates 
undergraduate programs; not as a standalone course, but rather as a “pervasive” theme in order 
to cultivate an information security conscious workforce in the future (ACM, 2013; Lunt et al., 
2008; Topi et al., 2010). Therefore, for information security to become pervasive, relevant topics 
could be taught, to some extent, in all of the modules of the main curriculum from first year 
through to the final year (Lunt, et al., 2008). In addition, core security skills should be identified 
and pervasively integrated into undergraduate computing curricula. This does not mean that each 
individual module needs to handle all the core security skills; however, each module should 
incorporate those most relevant through examples, scenarios and topics. 
Higher education institutions have made advances in implementing information security in 
postgraduate programs; however, there is still a need for a pervasive information security 
program in undergraduate computing curricula (Futcher et al., 2010). Information security 
education is necessary in ensuring that users have the required knowledge to behave in a secure 
manner and, users often need to be educated in order for them to be convinced to demonstrate 
new behaviour patterns (Okere, van Niekerk, & Carroll, 2012; Schein, 1999). The following 
section discusses information security behaviour. 
 
4. Information security behaviour 
There is general consensus in literature that user behaviour poses significant risk in the 
protection of information assets.  It is also acknowledged, however, that if users behave in a 
secure manner, this could lead to the successful protection of information assets (Alhogail & 
Mirza, 2014a; Thomson & von Solms, 2006; van Niekerk & von Solms, 2010). Although 
organisations invest a great deal in new technology in an effort to try and protect their 
information assets, this is not enough. Organisations need to focus more on user behaviour and 
find ways in which they can positively influence this behaviour to ensure that information 
security becomes second nature to their employees (Blythe, 2013). As mentioned previously, 
Appendix A 
108 | P a g e  
 
higher education institutions can be regarded as organisations and therefore the same information 
security concepts or principles would apply. 
The behaviour of users is critical in ensuring the protection of information assets. The focus of 
this research is primarily the behaviour of computing graduates regarding information security 
practices. It is, therefore, necessary to consider theories that deal with behaviour (van Niekerk, 
2005). One such theory is Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour which helps to understand how 
to change the behaviour of people. As the name suggests, this theory helps predict deliberate 
behaviour of people because behaviour can be planned (Ajzen, 1991). Figure 1 illustrates the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour elements that contribute to the behaviour of people. 
 
 
Figure 1-The Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(Ajzen, 1991) 
 
According to the theory, attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control all 
influence a person’s behavioural intent which ultimately determines their behaviour. Attitude is 
concerned with the person’s feelings and beliefs (Ajzen, 1991). The possibility of a person 
adhering to the correct behaviour is greater with a positive attitude. If users have a positive 
attitude towards information security, they are more likely to comply with the correct behaviour. 
Subjective norms are perceptions and expectations that the person has about the people and 
environment around them, for example, social groups (Ajzen, 1991). If the social group around a 
user is accepting of information security best practices, then the user will most likely be 
influenced to perceive information security in the same light.  Perceived behavioural control is 
concerned with the perceived capability of an individual to execute the required behavioural 
change. Furthermore, it includes an individual’s confidence in performing that behaviour (Ajzen, 
1991). Education could be used to specifically address the perceived behavioural control.  For 
example, if a user is given the correct skills and tools through education, they could feel more 
confident in altering their behaviour to the required information security behaviour. Behavioural 
intent represents the person’s willingness to achieve the required behaviour influenced by 
attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control (Ajzen, 1991). In the context of 
information security, if all three elements that influence behavioural intent are favourable, the 
intention towards behavioural change with regards to information security will be stronger. 
 
5. Information security culture 
Humans are potentially the “weakest link” when it comes to information security, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally. Protecting information should become second nature to all users. 
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Therefore, for information security to be effective, an information security culture should ideally 
exist (van Niekerk & von Solms, 2004; von Solms & von Solms, 2004). 
Schein (1999) defines culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it 
solves its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems”. This definition highlights two important 
factors. Firstly, shared basic assumptions need to be defined as the “working solution” to specific 
problems or challenges. Secondly, these shared basic assumptions need to be taught to new users 
as the acceptable behaviour. 
Information security culture forms part of the overarching organisational culture. Within the 
context of this paper, higher education institutions are organisations. Organisational culture, 
therefore, influences information security culture (Thomson & von Solms, 2005). The presence 
of a strong information security culture could possibly influence the information security 
behaviour of employees (Alhogail & Mirza, 2014). According to Hu et al.(2012), information 
security culture shapes and guides the information security behaviour. Similarly, an 
organisation’s information security culture is cultivated by the information security behaviour of 
its users (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010). If an information security culture does not exist within an 
organisation, the behaviour of new employees, for example computing graduates, coming into 
the organisation could influence the cultivation of an information security conscious culture (van 
Niekerk & von Solms, 2005; von Solms & von Solms, 2004b). 
There are a number of ways in which an information security culture could be cultivated. This 
would include, for example, education and influencing the behaviour of users. Education deals 
with teaching users about the importance of information security, their roles and responsibilities 
and why these roles exist. Behaviour is concerned with the attitudes, perceptions and intention of 
users with regard to conforming to the required behaviour (Schein, 1999). For the purposes of 
this paper, the focus is on information security behaviour of computing graduates within higher 
education institutions. 
Von Solms and von Solms (2004a) claim that to ensure that the behaviour and actions of users 
are aligned with management’s vision for the organisation, an appropriate information security 
culture should be cultivated. Information security culture is defined as “the collection of 
perceptions, attitudes, values, assumptions, and knowledge that guide the human interaction with 
information assets in an organisation with the aim of influencing employees’ security behaviour 
to preserve information security” (Alhogail & Mirza, 2014). This definition can be likened to the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour which deals with attitudes, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioural control, which ultimately influence behaviour.  Therefore, the more evident the 
information security culture is within higher education institutions, the more likely computing 
graduates will exhibit compliant security behaviour.  
A positive information security culture is essential as it is the driving force that reinforces 
individual and group behaviour. Positive user behaviour or compliant behaviour could help 
mitigate threats to information systems (Alhogail, 2015; Brien et al., 2013; Guo, 2013). A robust 
information security culture may alleviate many of the users’ behavioural issues that cause 
information security breaches (Alhogail & Mirza, 2014). 
 
6. Addressing the “weakest link” 
An information security culture could play an integral role in the protection of information assets 
by addressing humans as the ‘weakest link’. However, such a culture requires users who exhibit 
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acceptable information security behaviour. Behaviour can be influenced by a number of factors 
such as awareness and education. Lack of knowledge, negative behaviour and lack of 
commitment from users are the biggest concerns when it comes to the protection of information 
assets (van Niekerk & von Solms, 2005). However, knowledgeable or educated users could be 
the strongest link within organisations. In the context of higher education institutions, these users 
could be computing graduates. In order for an individual to become knowledgeable or educated 
about something, knowledge creation must take place.  
Nonaka (1994) highlights two dimensions of knowledge creation: explicit and tacit knowledge.  
Explicit knowledge is objective and it can be expressed in words, for example, policies in 
computing laboratories and curricula. Conversely, tacit knowledge is subjective and is difficult to 
formalize and communicate. It is rooted in action, commitment and involvement. Tacit 
knowledge is comprised of, for example, beliefs, assumptions, norms, attitudes as well as skills. 
There are four identified modes of the relationships between explicit and tacit knowledge that are 
referred to as Nonaka’s Modes of Knowledge Creation.  
 
 
Figure 2- Modes of Knowledge Creation 
(Nonaka, 1994) 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the Modes of Knowledge Creation which include Externalization, 
Combination, Internalization, and Socialization (Nonaka, 1994). Externalization is the 
conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. This means that the beliefs and principles 
are expressed verbally or in written form. Externalization can be articulated through dialogue 
between individuals or through policies (Nonaka, 1994). Combination is the process of 
transferring explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge. This means that knowledge can be 
transferred between groups. Explicit knowledge can be communicated, for example, through 
policies, posters, emails, and presentations (Nonaka, 1994). Education would specifically be used 
as a form of combination. Internalization transforms explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge. 
For example, values and beliefs explicitly expressed in policies, which the individual has to 
comprehend and comply with, are converted into the individual’s tacit knowledge (Nonaka, 
1994). Socialization is the mode where tacit knowledge is converted into tacit knowledge via the 
interaction of individuals. Socialisation is the result of non-verbal communication and interaction 
of individuals. An individual can absorb another individual’s tacit knowledge through 
observation and practice without articulating verbally.  Experience is vital to obtaining tacit 
knowledge (Nonaka, 1994).  According to the ACM guidelines, the core security knowledge that 
students need to be taught include, for example an understanding of security threats, 
Appendix A 
111 | P a g e  
 
vulnerabilities, legal and ethical aspects of information security and password security. Students 
are taught these core security topics in multiple classes through practicals, lectures and tutorials. 
This is the combination mode. During these practicals, lectures and exams, students internalise 
these core security topics. Through the interaction of students and educators, socialisation takes 
place. 
It is important for computing graduates to exhibit the correct information security behaviour, 
which may ultimately influence the information security culture both within the higher education 
institutions, as well as in their future working environments. Figure 3 depicts how to potentially 
influence the behaviour of computing graduates.   
 
 
Figure 3- Influencing the information security behaviour of computing graduates. 
 
Figure 3 represents the aspects of an individual’s behaviour, and the influences, both internal and 
external, that need to be considered in order to possibly change the individual’s behaviour.    
Externalization mode is the starting point in this diagram. It could be argued that computing 
curricula guidelines are required to explicitly explain how information security should be 
implemented as a pervasive theme in all computing curricula and indicate what should be taught. 
If people do not know how to behave with regards to information security, they cannot be 
expected to exude the required behaviour.  As mentioned previously, externalization is the 
process of converting tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. In Figure 3 the tacit knowledge 
of the authors of the ACM curricula guidelines is, for example, externalised into the various 
computing curricula. Combination occurs when explicit knowledge is transferred into explicit 
knowledge. This process happens when the students are taught in the classrooms or when they 
implement information security practices practically. Internalization is the transfer of explicit 
knowledge to tacit knowledge. When a student has learnt the information security practices 
(through combination), they should internalise that knowledge which then influences their 
attitudes, subjective norms and their perceived behavioural control. Their attitudes towards the 
required information security behaviour can be positive or negative. Subjective norms of an 
individual are influenced by the perceptions of what those around them think. If their social 
norms deem the required information security behaviour to be good, there is a greater chance that 
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the individual may be persuaded to change their behaviour. Conversely, if the individual’s 
environment is not conducive to the correct information security behaviour, then the chances that 
the individual will change their behaviour is less likely. Further, the more an individual feels 
confident to perform the necessary information security behaviour, known as perceived 
behavioural control, the greater their chance of actually conforming to that behaviour. This all 
forms part of the internalisation process. Socialization happens when tacit knowledge is 
transferred into tacit knowledge. As the name suggests, it is an on-going social process where 
individual knowledge is transferred by way of interaction, non-verbal communication and 
observation. 
So once the student has acquired the correct information security knowledge and they interact 
with other students and educators who demonstrate the required information security behaviour, 
this has the potential to influence the student to also demonstrate the required information 
security behaviour.  
An example could be that of user knowledge and behaviour relating to password security that 
would be important for computing graduates. This topic would need to be included in the 
curricula guidelines representing the tacit knowledge that has been externalised into explicit 
knowledge. This is the externalization process. These password security guidelines would then 
be transferred into the explicit knowledge of the students when they are taught in various classes. 
This is where the pervasiveness of information security throughout computing curricula is 
imperative. The topic of password security would not only be taught in a security related subject, 
but would be emphasised in multiple modules as being significant. This explicit password 
security knowledge could include the importance of password security; how to create strong 
passwords and how to protect the password, for example. This process is referred to as the 
combination process. The students then internalise this explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge 
through practical experience. In their practical classes, they could practice how to set up a good 
password. With enough practice, password protection could become second nature to these 
students. This knowledge could influence the attitudes and perceived behavioural control of the 
students. However, the subjective norms, which relate to the environment, would require that 
measures are in place, for example, in the computer laboratories to ensure adherence to password 
security best practices. The subjective norms, together with the attitudes and perceived 
behavioural control of the students will ultimately influence their behaviour regarding password 
security. With the socialization of students and educators, the process of tacit knowledge being 
transferred into tacit knowledge occurs. Students would observe and mimic how their educators 
and peers behave with regards to password security. Information security education is 
fundamental in influencing the behaviour of users.  It is essential in ensuring that users have the 
necessary knowledge to behave in a safe manner. If users have the required information security 
knowledge, it could positively influence their information security behaviour. Ultimately, an 
ideal environment would be one where the protection of information assets is second nature to 
users. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
For computing graduates the necessary information security knowledge should, ideally, be 
imparted in their undergraduate computing curricula as part of their studies.  However, for 
information security knowledge and practices to become part of the behaviour of computing 
graduates, it is argued that an isolated information security related module is not sufficient.  This 
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paper proposes that information security topics should be pervasively integrated throughout 
undergraduate computing modules in an attempt to influence the perceived behavioural control, 
attitudes and subjective norms of computing graduates.  This would have an impact on the 
behavioural intent of computing graduates and, ultimately, positively influence the information 
security behaviour of these computing graduates. When these graduates become employees in 
the workplace, they could positively influence the information security culture of the 
organisation. 
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A Model to Address Factors that Could Influence the Information Security Behaviour of 
Computing Graduates 
Name: Date of Interview: Module Code:  
 
Module Name: 
Level: 
1st year  
2nd year  
3rd year  
4th year  
 
Qualification: 
CS /IS/ IT  
 
Involved in Research: 
Yes  
No  
 Role at University: Class Size: 
Survey Objective 1: To determine the extent to which information security is integrated within computing curricula and the perceptions of 
computing educators regarding the pervasive integration of information security 
1. Do you teach any security-related modules? If yes, which level? 
2. Is information security pervasively integrated within other modules?  
If yes, which modules? 
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3. Do you think it should be an important part of your specific discipline? If yes, why? If no, why not? 
 
4. What are your views on the pervasive integration of information security within your discipline?  
 
5. Do you think that your colleagues share the same views with regard to the pervasive integration of information security? If yes, why? If no, why 
not?   
6. Do you foresee any perceived challenges with regard to the pervasive integration of information security? If yes, what perceived challenges do 
you foresee? 
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RO2: To determine the current information security behaviour of computing students and educators as perceived by computing educators. 
7. Do you think that your students behave in a secure manner? If yes, how so? If no, why do you say so? 
 
8. Are you aware of any behavioural policies within your institution?  
9. Are students aware of these ICT usage policies?  
10. Are there any consequences for “incorrect” ICT usage policy behaviour? If so, what are they? 
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11. Does an information security culture exist in your department amongst your colleagues? If yes, how so? 
12. How would you influence a student or colleague to behave more securely? 
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1. To what extent do you think the following security behaviours are important, where 1 indicates “not important” to 5 which indicates “very important”? 
RO3: To determine the importance of various information security behaviours as perceived by computing educators. 
Security-related behaviours 1 2 3 4 5 
3.1 Not using a computer to harm other people e.g. cyber bullying      
3.2 Not using computers to steal e.g. stealing information, software piracy etc.      
3.3 Not using computers to bear false witness e.g. fraudulent activity      
3.4 Not appropriating other people's intellectual output e.g. plagiarism      
3.5 Using a computer in a way that ensures consideration and respect for your fellow humans      
3.6 Not snooping around in other people’s computer files      
3.7 Not using other people's computer resources without authorisation or proper compensation      
3.8 Not interfering with other people's computer work      
3.9 Thinking about the social consequences of the program you are writing or the system you are 
designing 
     
3.10 Not copying or using proprietary software for which you have not paid       
(Whitman & Mattord, 2011) 
2. Are there any information security behavioural concepts, not listed above, that you think students should be made aware of? 
